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BODMER AND BREITINGER and EUROPEAN LITERARY THEORY

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"Der Deutsche ist von Natur mehr zum Denken als zum Dichten angelegt. Er muß sich oft das Wesen der Schönheit erst von Grund auf ergrübeln ehe er im Stande ist, die mit frischen Sinnen fröhlich zu genießen. Daher hat bei uns das Denken dem Dichten vielfach die Wege gewiesen; besonders ist die Wiedererweckung der deutschen Literatur im achtzehnten Jahrhundert der voraufgehenden Forschungsarbeit zu großem Danke verpflichtet."¹

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The literary history of Germany from the beginning of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century has little to show that is definitely national. So late as 1765 J. F. Löwen declared:

"Wir Deutsche kennen unseren Nationalcharakter noch nicht recht, oder besser, wir Deutsche haben in der Tat einen nicht genau zu bestimmenden Charakter. Bald neigen wir uns mehr auf die Seite der Engelländer, bald der Franzosen; und selbst unsere Sitten verrathen ein Gemisch von fremden Artigkeiten . . . und Lastern."²

And what was true of social characteristics and extravagances was true also in literature. From the Italian Renaissance critics German theorists took a classical, purely formalistic critical theory, which had little relation to contemporary life. In 1561 Scaliger declared Aristotle "Imperator Noster," supreme literary dictator. From Boileau too, the foremost French critic of his time, Germany took over a literary religion, which was classical and formal; and in Gottsched Boileau's ideas found a more rigid and uncompromising exponent than their originator. To Addison's idea that a lofty spirit might with advantage ignore the rules Gottsched was implacably opposed. From these rules, born thousands of years ago and sanctified by usage, there could be no deviation, no exception. The greatest work of art, in his view, was that which had the fewest transgressions against them. The question as to whether the writer should change, select or intensify parts of the original, the scope to be allowed to genius, the question which was to be debated for generations to come, was in Gott-

¹ Franz Servaes, *Die Poetik Gottscheds und der Schweizer*, Strasburg, 1887, Introduction, p. 1.

² *Schriften*, IV, Hamburg, 1765, p. 42.

sched's eyes no question, no problem at all. For to him the idea of natural genius was anathema. A poet was not born but made. He must climb Parnassus in the sweat of his brow. Genius was a gift for observation and classification. All works of art were to be judged by the moral they teach and in the *Iliad*, declares Gottsched, Homer teaches us that fighting is bad and peace is good while the *Odyssey* teaches that it is a bad thing for the state when the ruler is absent (!). Since the moral is the highest objective then the fable is the highest form of literature, and though more latitude may here be allowed, these "possible worlds" should be organized on logical and naturally possible lines. In drama, he holds, you should always see a vice or a virtue represented, vice rewarded by destruction and unhappiness, virtue by prosperity and happiness. If not then a play is useless and even harmful.³ The most difficult task of all for a tragic poet is to "make" a plot. Gottsched solves the difficulty for all aspiring playwrights by giving a recipe: First, choose your moral truth; then the plot to illustrate it; then divide this plot into five equal parts; see that each act is connected with the preceding one and the rest does not matter. To Gottsched a mixture of comedy and tragedy is unthinkable:

"Eine Tragikomödie giebt einen so ungereimten Begriff als wenn ich sagte, ein lustiges Klagelied. Es ist ein Ungeheuer."⁴

And a mixed character would be just as preposterous:

"Ein widersprechender Charakter ist ein Ungeheuer, so in der Natur nicht vorkömmt, darum muß ein Geiziger geizig, ein Stolz stolz, ein Hitziger hitzig, ein Verzagter verzagt seyn und bleiben."⁵

In Shakespeare's plays Gottsched blamed the mixture of tragedy and comedy, of great and common people, the introduction of ghosts, offences against the unities, the violence and the bloodshed. Gottsched marks the end of a period which had begun more than a century before with Opitz. He expresses scarcely one idea which points towards modern critical theory. It was the misfortune of so static a personality to have been born into a time of unusually rapid movement. It is the first stirrings of this movement that we wish to consider, a movement by which Germany was to enter the main channel of European critical theory.

It is rather surprising that Gottsched was able to maintain his sovereignty for so long, for beyond Germany's border a new world was rapidly taking shape. The dogma and authority of the Middle Ages were being seriously threatened. The invention of the microscope, Galileo with his telescope and Torricelli with his barometer were evidence of a new interest in the world of natural science. The three hundred years war of science had begun. In no other European country were these changes so suddenly marked as in France, then as at other times, the testing ground

³ Vernünftige Tadlerinnen, I, 17.

⁴ *Kritische Dichtkunst*, II, 11, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 10, 21.

for Europe's new ideas. There crown, church and nobles were fast losing their traditional prestige. Reason and Science were beginning to count for more than religion and authority. And these changes were not without their reflection in the field of literature. Writers were no longer the creatures of rich patrons but the creators of a justly feared public opinion, their employers the middle classes. Literature was no longer a mere ornament. The idea began to count for more than form. About 1750 there was hardly a poetical work in French literature, which counted in the movement of ideas. Boileau's old watchwords of Reason and classical authority were no longer valid. Dubos in his *Réflexions sur la Poésie et la Peinture* (1719) had already declared himself for the creative imagination, for sensibility in art as against reason, for pleasure as against the moral.

In Italy, despite the imposition of classical ideas by Scaliger in the sixteenth century the idea of the "fantasia che crea," the creative imagination, still remained alive, and at the beginning of the eighteenth century Italy again played an important role in the development of European critical theory:

"Italy, which led the critical theory of Europe in the sixteenth century, again played a pioneer role at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the conception of the 'creative imagination,' with the help of which Europe emancipated herself from the pincers of pseudo-classicism, was virtually born in Italy to grow to full maturity in England and France."⁶

Among these Italian critics Gravina and Muratori occupied an important place. Gravina started a movement towards an understanding of the real classical spirit instead of the pseudo-classical period of the Renaissance. To the critical theory of the eighteenth century Muratori⁷ made an important contribution. He boldly declared that imagination was more important than reason or rules and only to be checked by good taste; he laid down a theory of the Beautiful, based on the new and "the marvellous."

From England, too, Germany drew much, if not always directly. For the German middle classes, particularly of Northern Germany, there was in the courageous downright individualism of these "proud barbarians" as Voltaire had called them, a quality which was rather more sympathetic and familiar than was the Latin elegance and sophistication. In England the stressing of imagination and genius, now so important an element in European literary theory, was no new thing. From Bacon it had come down through Hobbes and Locke to Shaftesbury and Addison. With Shaftesbury the free play of passion was not to be dominated by reason; one emotion was to be checked, modified or intensified by another. Addison, though he left no unified system of aesthetics, discussed questions

⁶ J. G. Robertson, *Studies in the Genesis of the Romantic Theory in the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge, 1923, Chap. XII.

⁷ *Della perfetta Poesia Italiana*, 1706.

of genius and imagination⁸ which later influenced much of the theory of the English Romantic movement.

The years 1740 and 1741 mark the beginning of a new period in German critical literature and inaugurated a debate which was to last through the remainder of the century. It was in works⁹ published in these years that Bodmer and Breitinger advanced to the consideration of aesthetic problems already discussed in Italy by Calepio, Gravina and Muratori, in England by Addison and in France by Dubos. Up to that time German criticism had been trivial and personal, consisting largely of meaningless compliments or of personal invective. Bodmer and Breitinger, preceding J. E. Schlegel, Mendelssohn and Lessing in a field which has always been peculiarly German, declared for a critical examination of literature in the light of general principles, philosophic and aesthetic.

It may seem rather contradictory to say that although imagination is the central point of the Swiss poetics their ideas on the subject are not clear. Yet such is the case. Sometimes their ideas seem to agree with Addison's;¹⁰ Bodmer finds that imagination is largely the reproduction of impressions, stored up in the memory. He agrees too with Batteux: "Der Dichter muß ja nachahmen, nicht aber ganz neue Dinge schaffen."¹¹ Breitinger, while approving Milton's supernatural world, agrees with Gottsched in his fearfulness of encouraging superstition:

"Ich wollte nicht daß die Poesie mißbraucht würde den Aberglauben in seinen abentheuerlichen Träumen zu bestärken und dieselben noch weiter auszubreiten."¹²

The "Wonderful" and the creation of "Possible Worlds" should be limited to the Fable since here such license is justified by the moral end:

"Die ganze Natur sei eine Schule, in welcher uns der Schöpfer unter mancherlei Emblemen unsere Pflichten vorhalte; zudem haben die Tiere eine gewisse Gattung von Sprache; sie können

⁸ *Spectator*, nos. 411-41, June 21 - July 3, 1712.

⁹ By Breitinger: 1740, *Kritische Dichtkunst*, 2 vols., Zürich. The most important contribution to aesthetics of either of these Swiss writers. The general plan goes back to 1727, two years before Gottsched's *Critische Dichtkunst* was published.

By Breitinger: 1740, *Kritische Abhandlung von der Natur, den Absichten und dem Gebrauche der Gleichnisse*, a supplement to the preceding work.

By Bodmer: 1740, *Kritische Abhandlung von dem Wunderbaren in der Poesie*. By Bodmer: 1741, *Poetische Gemähde*.

Also by Bodmer and Breitinger: 1721, *Diskurse der Malern*, which contains many of the later ideas of Bodmer and Breitinger; for a critical account of this work see F. Breitmaier, *Geschichte der poetischen Theorie und Kritik*, Part I, Frauenfeld, 1888; also J. C. Crüger, *Introd. to Deutsche Nationalliteratur*, Vol. 42, Berlin, 1882.

Also by Bodmer and Breitinger: 1746, *Kritische Briefe*.

By Bodmer: 1736, *Briefwechsel von der Natur des poetischen Geschmacks*.

¹⁰ *Spectator*, nos. 411-12. A French translation of the *Spectator*, to which Bodmer probably had access, was published in Amsterdam in 1714. Addison's articles on *Paradise Lost* of Milton were translated by Bodmer and published in 1732.

¹¹ *Auszug aus Batteux, Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe*, 1746, III, p. 3.

¹² *Kritische Dichtkunst*, I, 340.

sich klagen, freudig stellen, einander lieblosen, zu Hülfe rufen, sie schmeicheln, drohen, bitten uns." ¹³

Under the Italian influence, however, the attitude of Bodmer and Breitinger is not so non-committal and they distinguish imagination from mere memory. Breitinger, indeed, in more than one passage, declares the chief mission of a poet to be the creation of an ideal world.

In his ideas on genius Bodmer shows a distinct departure from Gottsched's ideas:

"Große Geister, die aus Einsicht ihre Freiheit kennen, lassen sich durch keine Regeln in engere Schranken zwingen, als ihnen die Natur und Vernunft setzen." ¹⁴

Here Bodmer goes further than Breitinger. But both Swiss critics affirm the principle that the poet, in order to influence his audience, must be seized by the passion itself:

"Die poetische Raserey . . . das ist die hefftige Passion, mit welcher ein Poet für die Materie seines Gedichtes eingenommen ist. . . . Wenn er also erhitzt ist, so wachsen ihm, so zu sagen, die Worte auf der Zungen, er beschreibet nichts, als was er siehet, er redet nichts, als was er empfindet, er wird von der Passion fortgetrieben, nicht anderst als ein Rasender, der außer sich selbst ist, und folgen muß, wohin seine Raserey führet." ¹⁵

Bodmer is not sure whether this strong and active feeling, which enables the writer to describe the passions, is teachable or not. In his perplexity he gives us a series of passages from classical authors, showing various manners of describing the passions, for imitation by aspiring poets. Breitinger, however, declares such expression to be unteachable, a gift of nature.

It was the idea of the freely producing imagination which led both Bodmer and Breitinger to realize the difference between the epic of Homer and that of Virgil; this they were the first in German literature to stress. Here too it is possible that they owed a debt to the Italian and English critics. Already at the beginning of the century Gravina had emphasized Virgil's dependence on Homer and had protested against Scaliger's insistence on the superiority of the Latin to the Greek writer.¹⁶ In England one Thomas Blackwell had written *An Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer*,¹⁷ a pioneer work on the cultural conditions of the Homeric poem. Pope too had written an essay on the Greek writer. In his *Kritische Abhandlung von der Natur der Gleichnisse* Breitinger follows Pope very closely and remarks that Homer's characters remain individuals and speak

¹³ *Diskurse der Malern*. In the same work there is a rather amusing passage where Breitinger justifies a barrel in a fable being made to talk on the grounds 1) It has a mouth and a stomach, 2) It has a voice as one can hear when it is struck, 3) It flows (!) like a drunkard.

¹⁴ *Neue Kritische Briefe*, no. 58.

¹⁵ *Diskurse der Malern*. XIX Discours.

¹⁶ *Della Ragion Poetica*, 1708.

¹⁷ London, 1735.

according to their natures while Virgil's more typical characters utter generalities, which are just as appropriate to one character as to another. Homer's work is a 'Volksepos,' which makes of us listeners. Virgil's is a 'Kunstepos'; it is more ornate and makes of us readers only.¹⁸

As to taste in literature one's opinion of a work of art, Bodmer thinks, should depend on the opinion of men of good taste and not on any complicated rules of art. Dubos in his *Réflexions sur la Peinture et la Poésie* (1719), which Bodmer doubtless knew, had defined good taste as: "ce sixième sens qui est en nous sans que nous connaissions ses organes." But Bodmer, thinking like Addison that in the unrestricted individual instinct lay the danger of too great vagueness, declared that an educated man should be able to explain his judgments by reasons based on principles, discovered after investigation.

Of the theatre Bodmer had little practical knowledge. For that Switzerland offered but little opportunity. And yet his correspondence with Calepio¹⁹ is an important work by which to estimate the theory of the theatre before Lessing. Bodmer does not regard the moral as the chief thing in drama, but declares that from the true portrayal of character the audience will learn more. In Bodmer's view Aristotle had stressed the importance of the plot too much. The plot, says Bodmer, should spring from the meeting and friction between the characters; "attendrissement" or sympathy is to be regarded as the chief aim of tragedy rather than "Verwunderung" or admiration and to achieve this the dramatist should employ subjects and characters not too far removed from the sympathies of the audience. In 1738 in a letter to Gottsched Bodmer says that he preferred: "Das Traurige und Notleidende" to examples of "Helden die sich über die Sphäre der Menschen hinaufschwingen." Bodmer saw clearly that:

"... in einem jeden Menschen zwei wohl zu unterscheidende Personen wohnen, deren Einsichten und Absichten, selten übereinstimmen, die miteinander in Streit liegen, da bald diese, bald jene die Oberhand bekommt."²⁰

And again:

"Ich kann auch nicht sehen warum die Hauptperson nicht neben einer Menge Tugenden auch Schwachheiten an sich haben dürfte."²¹

Here were the first outspoken preferences in Germany for the new middle-class drama and for the individual English characters as contrasted to the stereotyped, arbitrary French characters of Corneille and Racine.

¹⁸ *Kritische Dichtkunst*, I, 43.

¹⁹ *Kritische Briefe*, Zürich, 1746. The originals of many of these letters are in the civic library in Zürich as well as a copy of Muratori's *Perfetta Poesia Italiana*, 1724 ed., annotated by Bodmer.

²⁰ *Poetische Gemälde*, p. 15.

²¹ *Kritische Briefe*, p. 90.

There is, of course, a danger of overrating the importance of Bodmer and Breitinger in the development of German critical theory; after all, they still remain children of the transition from Wolff to Lessing. It is true that they were pioneers but pioneers — and this is a reproach which may also be levelled against other theorists of the eighteenth century — much of whose material was borrowed. Bodmer was very much what Goethe called him, “Eine Henne für Talente,” a tireless collector of other men’s ideas; and his collecting was not always direct. English influences would seem to have reached him through French channels and his astonishingly modern ideas on the theatre cannot be explained by close connection with any actual theatre or by an intimate knowledge of Shakespeare’s works. From Calepio Bodmer probably received a stimulus, which his own experience could not supply. Neither Bodmer nor Breitinger, while attempting an analysis of the respective natures of poetry and painting, succeeded in defining the boundaries to the provinces of these arts and they revealed but little insight into the nature of the differences between the various types of poetry.

And yet the debt that German critical theory owes them is by no means a small one. Much of the ground that these pioneers selected and cleared proved fertile though not in all cases in their own time. They had already foreshadowed, if somewhat dimly, the idealizing activity²² of the literary artist, advocated by J. E. Schlegel and adopted as a theory by Lessing and Mendelssohn. By their idea that the poet should be seized by the Passion itself they gain a place in the history of the development of the idea of genius in eighteenth century literary theory. It is true that this idea of Feeling was not original; it had already been expressed by the classical writers but the importance of its re-affirmation was very soon to be illustrated by the publication of Klopstock’s *Messias*. From this to the idea that literature was to be no longer an academic exercise or a polite pastime was but a step. The Swiss critics had realized quite early in their career one dangerous tendency to which German writers were particularly prone, the exaggeration of the academic and the philosophical:

“Die Lustbarkeiten des Verstandes haben ihr ganzes Gemüthe eingenommen und diese unterdrücken die Lustbarkeiten der Einbildungskraft.”²³

The movement towards simplicity and truth in style, which Bodmer and Breitinger helped to start, gave the death-blow to the Marinism of the Second Silesian School, still prevalent in their time, and helped to bring back to the literature of Germany a long-lost popular note. This popular element Bodmer strongly supported in the theatre. In advocating the turning away from the “typical” and pseudo-classical to the “mixed” in-

²² In the *Diskurse der Malern*, III, 21 and IV, 17 they declare that the poet and the painter must clarify their own ideas of the original before they take up pen or brush.

²³ *Diskurse der Malern*. Discours XIX.

dividual characters he was pointing forward to the "Problematische Naturen" of a later date, the Weisslingens, the Werthers, the Fausts.

All that Bodmer and Breitinger claimed for themselves was that they had helped good taste to gain the mastery:

"Wir wollen zufrieden seyn, daß der Geschmack die Oberhand bekommen hat, und dieses können wir mit Rechte sagen, nachdem kein elendes Gedichtgen weder mitten in Deutschland, noch in einem Winkel desselben den Kopf emporheben kann, welches nicht augenblicklich ausgepiffen würde."²⁴

This, however, is too modest a claim. Breitinger's *Kritische Dichtkunst* with its supplement the *Kritische Abhandlung* marks a break with Gottsched and the formalism, which had lasted since Opitz. In the words of one of the ablest of English critics of German eighteenth century literature:

"In spite of all its limitations, contradictions and pedantry Breitinger's *Kritische Dichtkunst* has a place beside the other two great European books of its time, which books laid the foundations of the modern conception of poetry, Muratori's *Perfetta Poesia Italiana* and du Bos' *Réflexions sur la Poésie et la Peinture*."²⁵

²⁴ *Neue Kritische Briefe*, ed. Stäudlin, 1741, p. 105.

²⁵ J. G. Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 281.



THE MASTER BUILDER and DIE VERSUNKENE GLOCKE

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It has been conjectured by Woerner¹ and others that Ragnar, the gifted engineer in the service of Solness, may have been inspired by Gerhart Hauptmann, whose *Einsame Menschen* had come as a challenge to Ibsen's fame. The challenge must have been unmistakable to Ibsen as to everyone else. *Einsame Menschen* clearly invited comparison with his *Rosmersholm*. Ibsen was in Germany at the time and may have felt Hauptmann's success as a threat to his own position. But certainly no one suspected then that the great Ibsen feared competition. Even his most outspoken critic, Knut Hamsun, considered his fame unshakable and — in a series of public lectures which Ibsen attended — attacked him for leaving no room for younger talent.² It is not improbable, therefore, that Ragnar — the representative of younger talent in *The Master Builder* — was first suggested by that other representative of the younger generation, Gerhart Hauptmann. The appearance of *Die Versunkene Glocke* a few years later removed all doubt as to Hauptmann's desire to beat Ibsen on his own ground. This play is a reconception of *The Master Builder* in much the same way as *Einsame Menschen* was a reconception of *Rosmersholm*, but this time Hauptmann works with sovereign independence, transforming all that he appropriates.

The theme of youth against age is given a prominent place in *The Master Builder*. To Solness, Ragnar represents the whole younger generation which is battering at his door. The doubt which had arisen in Solness' mind as to his own superiority as a craftsman, was shared by Ibsen. A striking example of an artist whose confidence had not kept pace with his achievement had come to Ibsen's attention before he left Munich for Norway in 1891. It was the legend about the architect of the St. Michael's church in Munich who threw himself from the tower of the church he had built, out of fear that the vaults might not hold.³ Commenting upon this legend, Ibsen said, "People have the true instinct that no one can with impunity build so high."⁴

There can be no doubt that Hauptmann's compound symbol of "hoalb ane Kerche, hoalb a Keenigsschluß" in *Die Versunkene Glocke* was inspired by *The Master Builder*. The building of high towers on homes is something very unusual, and it will be seen that Ibsen's tower symbol is a very artificial, intellectual symbol. The church-castle is no less artificial, but Hauptmann did not give it any prominent place in his drama, nor did he load it with philosophical abstractions. His debt to Ibsen, as far as the loan of symbols is concerned, is not a heavy one. The symbols of the sun and the bell, so rich in emotional content, are all his own.

¹ Woerner, Roman: *Henrik Ibsen*, Munich, 1912, vol. 2, p. 265.

² Koht, Halvdan: *The Life of Ibsen*, New York, 1931, vol. 2, p. 288-90.

³ Ibid. p. 299-300.

⁴ Ibid. p. 300.

There is an excellent interpretation of *The Master Builder* in Weigand's book, *The Modern Ibsen*. Weigand's minute scrutiny of the text has laid bare the finest threads of psychology in the drama, but there is one problem that still seems in need of clarification: the real significance of the tower symbol in relation to the builder himself. As far as Hilda is concerned, Weigand convincingly proves that the tower is no abstract symbol. Hilda requires of Solness that he build real, physical towers, and climb "to a dizzy height". "During the whole period of adolescence," Weigand writes, "there is ever present the danger of the pleasure coupled with sensations of sexual origin becoming so closely bound up in the conscious mind with irrelevant processes, as to divert the whole development of sex life from its normal course. That is what happened to Hilda."⁵ Her first complete sex experience was caused by vertigo induced by watching Solness mount to the summit of the church-tower.

It is true, as Weigand says, that symbols may carry a multiplicity of meanings. The tower may represent one thing with respect to Hilda and another with respect to Solness. But Weigand suggests several possibilities in the case of Solness, and concludes: "the tower [on the dwelling house] must have been built with a view to propitiating the powers that pursued him."⁶ But this interpretation does not seem altogether satisfactory. Hilda, although for her own reasons, is just as anxious as Solness that he should build towers, by which she simply means "— something that points — points up into the free air."⁷ And Solness agrees that "that is just what he is most anxious to do." It will be shown that this urge to build towers is Solness' besetting sin, rather than a wish to do penance. The very fact that the idea also occurred to Hilda is significant. Moreover, Ibsen's comment on the architect legend, already quoted, is evidence that Ibsen is using the tower as a symbol of challenge rather than of propitiation.

A different view of the tower is taken in the centennial edition of Ibsen's works, edited by Didrik Arup Seip, where it is defined as a "symbol of art without consideration for other things",⁸ or in other words, a symbol of "art for art's sake". But Solness by no means tried to free his *art* from the service of God, he tried to free *himself*, to become a master in his own right. And since his greatest artistic achievement, his most daring accomplishment, had consisted in defying both gravitation and God by the building of high towers, it is only natural that he should wish to continue to build towers, dedicated not to God but to himself. "Art for the artist's sake" perhaps defines the tower symbol better than does the cliché. But it is of first importance to observe that "art for the artist's sake" is anything but an ideal to Ibsen. On the contrary, it is an indictment of his own life in the form of a question: Is it possible that I have served myself first in serving freedom? *The Master Builder* says that this is possible.

⁵ Weigand, Hermann J.: *The Modern Ibsen*, New York, 1925, p. 291.

⁶ Ibid. p. 287.

⁷ Ibsen, Henrik: *The Works of Henrik Ibsen*, Viking Edition, Scribner, New York, *The Master Builder* (in vol. 10) p. 312.

⁸ Ibsen, Henrik: *Samlede Verker*, Hundrearsutgave, Gyldendal, Oslo, vol. 14, p. 23.

The drama is extremely personal — so personal that Ibsen was almost afraid to be understood. Solness represents Ibsen at the height of his fame, dazzled by his European fame, and uncertain of himself in the face of it — a builder caught by dizziness as he looks down on the cheering crowd. This pinnacle of fame upon which Ibsen found himself seems definitely to be represented by the symbol of the tower. To keep one's balance on this tower, according to Solness, is to "do the impossible".

Heinrich, the bell-founder — like Solness, the builder — came of Christian parents and chose a profession in which he could serve God. And — also like Solness — he finds the church too narrow for his genius. So he transfers his allegiance from the "crucified Christ", for whom he has no love, to "Urmutter Sonne" — as Solness severed connections with God in order to be a master in his own right as a builder of homes. Heinrich is not conscious of wrongdoing in leaving the church, and is so naïve that he believes the pastor himself will follow his example: "dem Menschendienst entfliehn, um Gott zu suchen."⁹ God must be sought outside the church, for it is a human institution "welche Pöbelkunst gebacken aus Hoffart, Bosheit, Galle, allem Schlechtem."¹⁰ The finest bell he ever made was imperfect because it was made in the valley, i. e. in the Christian community, or within the church. He knew even before the accident that the bell was imperfect. As an artist he owes it to himself to break away from the church, but he has not the courage that Solness had — until love of the beautiful Rautendelein makes a new man of him. Rejuvenated by his new-found love he seems unconscious of wrongdoing even in leaving wife and family. He knows no longer the difference between right and wrong. He has falcon's claws for fingers, he says.¹¹ If the pastor reproaches him for his desertion, all Heinrich can say is: "Hier helfe Gott!"

The difference between Solness and Heinrich here is that Solness *had* the courage to break with the church, with the result that his "tender conscience" tormented him for ten years and nearly drove him insane, before, on the day of his death, his love of Hilda helped him to achieve a "viking's conscience."¹² Heinrich's conscience was proof against remorse *as long as he believed in his mission*, as long as he was convinced of "seines Tuns Gewicht und reinem Wert."¹³

Rautendelein's love made Heinrich strong — as long as Rautendelein remained "ein schönes, goldhaariges Waldfräulein". But Heinrich's love changed Rautendelein — as Rebecca West, Anna Mahr, and for a moment even Hilda, had been changed by their contact with Christian morality. For Heinrich, no less than Solness, had remained a Christian after he left the church, in spite of his longing for the sun — as even the pastor ought to have understood from his words:

⁹ Hauptmann, Gerhart: *Das Dramatische Werk*, Fischer Verlag, 1932, *Die Versunkene Glocke* (in part 2), p. 320.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 329.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 326-7.

¹² *The Master Builder*, p. 403-4.

¹³ *Die Versunkene Glocke*, p. 343.

"So aber treten alle wir ans Kreuz
und, noch in Tränen, jubeln wir hinan,
wo endlich, durch der Sonne Kraft erlöst,
der tote Heiland seine Glieder regt
und strahlend, lachend, ewiger Jugend voll,
ein Jüngling in den Maien niedersteigt." ¹⁴

Heinrich's love changes Rautendelein. She becomes less and less the "Waldfräulein" and more and more a woman.¹⁵ She learns what tears are; she adopts the Christian view of nature, according to which it is cursed and in need of redemption; she speaks of Heinrich as the "White One", the "Sun Hero", but she identifies him with Balder, the most "Christian" of the heathen gods.

Hilda, on the other hand, did not for long allow the gentler feelings of sympathy with Mrs. Solness to interfere with her desires. She is uncompromising because she is not, in the true sense of the word, a woman. We learn from her conversation with the doctor that she has had experience with men, but that had meant little to her. The fact that Solness is a married man is of no consequence for the rôle that she wants him to play for her benefit. In fact she becomes a little irritated when Solness falls in love with her. That is not what she wants from him.

It must be admitted that Hauptmann's is the more pleasant example of "Motivierung aus dem Unbewußten". Rautendelein is about to become a mother when we meet her in the fourth act. She is no longer a child. She is anxious for the safety of Heinrich, sensing danger everywhere. Like Heinrich she is "fremd und daheim dort unten – so hier oben fremd und daheim." ¹⁶ As Schlenther says: "Wie [Heinrichs] Fleisch und Blut in ihrem Körper zu quillen beginnt, so geht auch das Stück Christentum, das *er* verliert, in *sie* ein." ¹⁷

There is a parallel between Solness, the employer and exploiter of Ragnar – not to mention the mysterious "helpers and servers" – and Heinrich, the taskmaster to the dwarfs. Solness' harsh treatment of Ragnar and his father cannot be forgiven on the grounds that the builder is intent upon the success of his work. Nor can we altogether condone Heinrich's cruelty to the dwarfs on such grounds. For Heinrich, too, has lost his zeal. He is sparing of himself, and unbending in his insistence upon "the prescribed amount of work" from the dwarfs. But they are unwilling and accomplish nothing; only when one of them openly disobeys him and forms the glowing iron with his bare hands does anything come of it. Admiring the result, Heinrich takes the credit for work to which he has contributed nothing:

"Nie ward ich so wie jetzt beglückt,
nie stimmte Hand und Herz so überein.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 325.

¹⁵ And, incidentally, Heinrich begins to resemble Johannes Vockerat more and more, continually hurting Rautendelein's feelings without intending to do so.

¹⁶ *Die Versunkene Glocke*, p. 346.

¹⁷ Schlenther, Paul: *Gerhart Hauptmann*, ed. 3, Berlin, 1922, p. 152 and 154.

Was mäkelst du? Bin ich der Meister nicht?
Willst du, Gesell, dich mehr zu sein vermessen?"¹⁸

The dwarf whispers something into his ear, whereat Heinrich becomes pale, heaves a sigh and angrily replaces the piece on the anvil, saying: "So mag der Satan dieses Werk vollenden!"¹⁹ The emphasis in reading this line must be on "vollenden". What the dwarf whispered to him must have been to the effect that neither Heinrich nor God had had anything to do with the success of that piece. Another dwarf defies Heinrich and destroys it right afterwards.

That is the end of Heinrich's work in the smithy. But it is important to notice what sort of work he was doing. The stage directions read: "Geschmiedete Stücke und Gußstücke liegen umher: Architektonisches und Figürliches".²⁰ This is significant. When an artist lacks inspiration he cannot undertake anything ambitious, but he may touch up a detail here and there. So with Heinrich, he is doing ornamental work although his temple is far from complete. In vain he turns to Rautendelein; she is no longer able to inspire him with "die tolle Siegerlust":

"Sag' mir eines, Kind:
Glaubst du an mich? - - -
Gib meiner Seele den erhab'nen Rausch,
denn sie bedarf zum Werk! Denn: wie die Hand
mit Zang und Hammer mühsam werken muß,
den Marmor spalten und den Meißel führen,
wie dies mißbrät und jenes nicht gedeiht
und sich der Fleiß ins Kleinste muß verkriechen -
verliert auch oft sich Rausch und Zuversicht,
verengt sich oft die Brust, der Blick ermattet,
der Seele klares Vorbild schwindet hin:
in all dem Tagelöhner-Werkelkram
dies himmlische Geschenk nicht einzubüßen,
das - sonnenduftig - keine Klammer hält,
ist schwer."²¹

Such complaints are no doubt uttered from time to time by all true artists, so we are not justified in saying that Heinrich has abandoned his ideal of perfection. On the contrary, it is only because he is trying to do the impossible that he cannot succeed. But he has realized that the task is beyond him. And he remains with Rautendelein after his mission has been abandoned, doing "Tagelöhner-Werkelkram" in order to maintain himself as "Meister" and to justify to himself his remaining with Rautendelein.

Here the comparison with Solness is very interesting. Building homes no longer interests him at the moment of Hilda's coming. And yet he

¹⁸ *Die Versunkene Glocke*, p. 333.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 333.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 331.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 337-8. Italics are mine.

must build more and more feverishly every year, never allowing a single contract to go to anyone else. It is all a matter of maintaining himself in his position. The great ideal of making men happy — on the strength of which he had rebelled against God — is a thing of the past. Building homes for human beings is not worth a rap, he says to Hilda.²² But Ibsen indicates clearly that there is need of new homes; the stage directions to the third act call for huts adjacent to Solness' sumptuous home. Solness apparently once more resents the restrictions placed on the builder — the impatience of the young couples who wish to get married, their being satisfied with a roof over their heads, with a mere address, a place to live, rather than a home. In fact, Solness had long since become disillusioned. His mission is discarded, but he continues to build to protect his position as the leading builder. Ragnar must be kept down by fair or foul means. Luck is really what made Solness greater than the others, he fears. And to compensate his ego for this admission — born of fear, and without any objective basis — he cherishes the thought that he possesses unusual power of will and personality. He is great because he has the power to command the services of certain mystical "helpers and servers". This is what other people call luck, but he knows better: this power is a quality of the really great individual. Curiously enough, Heinrich too has his "helpers and servers" who are none too easily controlled. When they openly disobey him, he gives up the battle.

Neither Hilda nor Rautendelein could inspire their lovers to "do the impossible", as Ibsen puts it.²³ For Heinrich, too, has undertaken the impossible: he will create perfection.

"Ans Unvollkomm'ne heftet sich der Fluch,
der, war er machtlos hier, zum Spotte wird.
Er soll zum Spotte werden!"²⁴

As we have learned from Rautendelein, God's curse lies on nature because it is imperfect. Heinrich wants to create something perfect and thus *lift God's curse from nature*. To do this he has ventured "mit Göttern um den Preis zu würfeln".²⁵ He has committed the same crime as Solness who would set himself up as God's peer.²⁶ While Solness' motive was questionable from the outset, Heinrich's motive was a noble one, although pride and selfishness crept in later. Solness perhaps never sincerely entertained the idea of devoting himself to the service of human happiness. There may be those who would question the unselfishness of Heinrich's motives as well, but as Fechter says: "Im Aufstieg des Dramas ist Meister

²² *The Master Builder*, p. 425.

²³ *Ibid.* p. 351, etc.

²⁴ *Die Versunkene Glocke*, p. 340.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 341.

²⁶ The picture of Jacob struggling with God, which hung in Johannes Vockerat's living room, is proof, however, that Hauptmann had been approaching this theme earlier.

Heinrichs Ringen um sein Werk von seiner Liebe zu Rautendelein unabtrennbar; erst im Abstieg wird die Gefühlswelt entscheidend."²⁷

The last act of *Die Versunkene Glocke*, which by some has been considered unnecessary to the play, is of interest to the present comparison for two reasons. First, Hauptmann — in contradistinction to Ibsen — shows his desire to be understood, by letting "Die Wittichen" appraise Heinrich in terms of neo-pagan philosophy, which Hauptmann sees as the antithesis of Christianity. Heinrich stood between Christianity and paganism. He tried to unite the two in his life, but his Christian conscience would not let him compromise with paganism. Striving to harmonize the two "Weltanschauungen" — symbolized by the bell and the sun — into "Sonnen-glockenklang", he merely succeeded in creating that monstrous structure, "hoalb ane Kerche, hoalb a Keenigsschluß". No suggestion of the pagan ideal can be found in this symbol, for Heinrich had not in reality attained to a pagan outlook. The "Keenigsschluß" suggests the man who, in the words of the "Nickelmann", "will über Gott und Menschen Herrscher sein"²⁸ and who, with the help of Rautendelein, had lorded it over nature as well.

And secondly, the last act brings the confession of Heinrich — in retrospect unjust to himself — that he had left the Christian church in order to possess Rautendelein. "Die Wittichen" has placed three glasses of wine before him. He has drunk the white one, which stands for "das lichte Leben", the sun-worship, or his mission; he takes the second one, which stands for Rautendelein, and says:

"Um deinetwillen griff ich nach dem ersten,
und stündest du nicht da, du köstlicher
mit deinem Rausch und Duft: das Zechgelag,
zu dem uns Gott auf diese Welt geladen,
es wäre gar zu ärmlich und, mich dünkt —
du hehrer Gastfreund — schwerlich deiner würdig.
Nun aber dank ich dir."²⁹

Afraid of death (which "die Wittichen" confronts him with in the form of the third wine glass) Heinrich had fled back into the mountains before the enraged church-people, but in nature at sunrise he finds the courage to die without regretting his life, reconciled with God.

Solness died without leaving any confession, and a thousand speculations are possible on the reason why he fell to his death. His physical dizziness, Hilda's delirious cry, retribution, a guilty conscience, advancing age — all these contributed to his fall. The first time, when Solness in overweening egotism defied God, he had deserved to fall. This time — if there be justice — he had deserved to succeed. For the first time in his life Solness was really great, for the first time he risked his life nobly — intent on actually *doing* what he had declared to God he would do. To satisfy

²⁷ Fechter, Paul: *Gerhart Hauptmann*, Dresden, 1922, p. 106-7.

²⁸ *Die Versunkene Glocke*, p. 343.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 365.

Hilda, he will climb to the top of the tower, as he had done once before, but this time not to challenge the power of God but manfully to say: "Hear me, Mighty God — thou may'st judge me as seems best to thee. But hereafter I will build nothing but the loveliest thing in the world —." And Solness continues: " — build it together with a princess, whom I love — — — and then I will say to him: Now I shall go down and throw my arms round her and kiss her — ." ³⁰ And here Solness utters the most significant words in the play: " — and come down to earth — and *do as I said to him.*" ³¹ Recognizing God's greater power — meaning that he surrenders the vainglorious claim to supernatural power of his own — Solness yet dares to defy God and take the consequences.

We realize that both Ibsen and Hauptmann "held doomsday" over themselves in these plays. And they condemned themselves by questioning the unselfishness of their devotion to the ideals they professed to serve. Genius may have its rights, but unless genius succeeds, who can tell genius from ambition and love of fame? Nor does success make happy. Solness laughs when he says: "Only think — to be Solness the master builder! Halvard Solness! What could be more delightful?" ³²

In Ibsen's own life, genius had been his excuse for not going to war in defense of Denmark. With Hauptmann, genius was his only sanction for ruining the life of wife and children, as we may read in his *Buch der Leidenschaft* which tells the story of Hauptmann's marriage tragedy without any dramatic disguise.

It seems as if Ibsen in his old age began to question all conscious motives. Perhaps he had himself merely taken advantage of those great watchwords of the century, freedom, independence, freedom under responsibility, or whatever was the cry of the hour, in order to escape real obligations. His work had made him famous, and a rich man. Missionaries who prosper in a worldly sense are apt to have trouble with their conscience. Ibsen had left Norway in indignation when the Norwegians failed their Danish brothers who were attacked by Prussia. He showed his indignation in a burning poem ³³ — *but he did not fight himself* although a close friend of his, the clergyman Christopher Bruun, did. In *Brand* this friend was immortalized, and in *The Master Builder* Ibsen settles accounts with himself for having failed in his life to "do as I said." He, like Solness, had been too intent on something else, his own fame. And they had bought fame at the cost of their peace of mind. Hauptmann and Heinrich had paid the same price.

To use the language of Kleist, they had allowed their centre of gravity to become displaced. As long as Solness built churches to please God, his centre of gravity was where it should be; if he had in fact built homes to promote the happiness of men, no loss of "grace" would have

³⁰ *The Master Builder*, p. 428-9.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 429. Italics are mine.

³² *Ibid.* p. 282.

³³ Ibsen: *Samlede Verker*, vol. 14, p. 306-7.

resulted. But building churches or homes for the sake of honour and glory is like dancing with the centre of gravity in the elbow.

It is significant that Solness built towers *on* old churches more often than he built churches. The meaning of that can only be that *he used the church for his own purpose*, viz. to gain fame as a builder. Then, when he had tasted fame, he would no longer confine himself to the building of churches. Likewise with the social betterment. What Ibsen and Solness sought was freedom to develop their talent. Again Solness wanted to erect towers *above* the homes he built.³⁴ Building a castle in the air, of course, suggests abandoning building for fame and greatness, and building instead "the most beautiful thing in the world" *within himself*. He will try to become as great morally as artistically.³⁵ In other words, Ibsen declares himself done with all "literary exploitation" of church and society. And as a matter of fact, Ibsen engaged in no further polemics on state and church.³⁶ For the rest of his life he tried desperately to rise above his love of fame and distinction, but perhaps with less success than Solness. Unhappily his mind gave way before his death, so we do not know whether he faced death as serenely as did Solness.

Die Versunkene Glocke is a "Märchendrama" in verse form. As such it is as unlike *The Master Builder* as a play could be, while it has much more in common with *Peer Gynt*. The sun shines in Hauptmann's drama; in *The Master Builder* there is at least one character who wears a green eye-shade, only Hilda can at times be imagined with the sun shining in her hair. It is useless to try to define *The Master Builder*. Jaeger calls it "a study in morbid psychology" and "one of the most puzzling plays that Ibsen ever wrote".³⁷ Archer considers it "of all his writings . . . the most original" and affirms that "it shows no slightest vestige of outside influence. It is Ibsen, and nothing but Ibsen."³⁸ On the other hand, Bartels with reference to *Die Versunkene Glocke* overemphasizes Hauptmann's indebtedness to Ibsen when he says that *The Master Builder* furnished "das Grundverhältnis bis auf den Sturz und die Ideen".³⁹

There is namely one fundamental difference between the two plays, a difference which proves that Hauptmann's indebtedness by no means extends "bis auf die Ideen". I am referring to the fact that for Solness the important thing is never *what to build*, but *under what circumstances to build*. There is no indication whatever in the play that Solness is dissatisfied with the church-towers that he built, as Heinrich was with his bells. Solness was only too well pleased with his work. It is the freedom

³⁴ Note that Solness *added* a tower to an old church at Lysanger (p. 287). Note also Hilda's phrase "over these homes" (p. 311), and observe that Solness consistently divorces the church-tower from the church in his speech (p. 311, 347, etc.)

³⁵ The "firm foundation" (p. 409) under the castle in the air is, of course, a symbolic expression for being true to one's word.

³⁶ *The Master Builder*, Introduction by W. Archer, p. 227.

³⁷ Jaeger, Henrik: *Henrik Ibsen*, Chicago, 1901, p. 288 and 295.

³⁸ *The Master Builder*, Introduction, p. 240-1.

³⁹ Bartels, Adolf: *Gerhart Hauptmann*, Berlin, 1906, p. 192.

of the builder that matters. In Hauptmann's play it is also a question of the freedom of the artist, but here it is not "freedom from what?" as much as "freedom to what?" Heinrich wants to be *free to serve God in his art*. Solness demands freedom from restrictions of any kind, *freedom from service*. Hauptmann's freedom is positive freedom; Ibsen's is negative.

By building towers not dedicated to God, Solness means to assert his independence. They are to bear witness to his greatness as a builder. He had already won recognition as a builder, but there is the constant rumour that he is really afraid of building so high, and he cannot continue to prove his greatness except by building towers. The tower on his home, therefore, must be a symbol of fame. It suggests the worthlessness of fame and the haunting fear of losing it; it stands for the unhappiness it brings to the possessor and the price that must be paid for it, and it even hints at the deleterious effects of fame upon those who stand below and watch. As a symbol it is abstract in the extreme, and it is negative, for Ibsen rejects all that it stands for.

Hauptmann's symbols are positive. The sun and the bell symbolize the ideals that Heinrich tries to unite. They are not enigmatic abstractions but concrete realities that represent to the senses as well as to the imagination what they stand for. And they combine beauty with emotional appeal. In contrast, the tower symbol is cold when seen in relation to Solness, and a nightmare in relation to Hilda.



PAUL ERNST'S TRANSITION FROM THE DRAMA TO THE EPIC¹

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One of the most difficult and problematical writers in modern German literature, Paul Ernst was for a long time either disregarded entirely or dismissed superficially. Only gradually a clearer picture has emerged of the titanic struggle of this superb human spirit not only with the immediate problems of his own time but as well with the problems of man's ultimate destiny.

Ernst regarded the drama as the highest literary form and his foremost ambition was to create a new type of "high" tragedy. Yet his prolonged and significant dramatic productivity came to a sudden close with the *Chriembild* of 1918. Turning at that point to the verse epic, he devoted his principal energies during the remaining years of his life to the immense *Kaiserbuch* and the shorter *Heiland*. This complete abandonment of the "highest" literary form is not sufficiently explained by the "national" reasons he advanced for undertaking the *Kaiserbuch* nor by his painstaking effort to reconcile this step with his previously postulated literary theories.

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The following statement might well be considered a key to the work of Ernst:

„Die allgemeine Aufgabe des Menschen, die er in allen Zeiten erfüllen muß, ist, zu Gott zu kommen. Erfüllt er diese Aufgabe nicht, dann ist sein Leben ohne Inhalt, dann verkümmert er in irgendeiner Weise.“²

Paul Ernst was almost constantly torn by the antagonism between an unusually pronounced feeling that man is subject to necessity or fate and no less striking a will to freedom. Like thesis and antithesis, the sides of this dualism find alternately preponderant expression in his work, dominated always by his intensely passionate effort to find God.

After rejecting the ethical relativism of naturalism, to which he had subscribed briefly, Ernst formulated a creed of his own which embraces these ethical postulates: the moral dignity of man, an absolute moral code, and free will as a transcendental reality. Upon realizing his calling as a dramatist, or more especially as a writer of tragedies, he set forth a corresponding series of literary postulates. The modern dramatist is definitely limited by the prevailing ethical relativism in his treatment of ethical ideals:

¹ Paper read before Discussion Group German V of the MLA, Dec. 28, 1940. References are to Paul Ernst's *Gesammelte Werke in 19 Bänden*, Langen-Müller, München, 1928-1937: WzF *Der Weg zur Form*; C *Ein Credo*; ZI *Der Zusammenbruch des deutschen Idealismus*; EG *Erdachte Gespräche*; Dr II, III *Dramen* 2., 3. Band; and to works published by Langen-Müller but not included in the *Gesammelte Werke*: GwW *Geist, werde wach!* 1921; KI, II, III *Das Kaiserbuch*, 1. *Die Sachsenkaiser*, 2. *Die Frankenkaiser*, 3. *Die Schwabenkaiser*, 1935-1936; H *Der Heiland*, 1937.

² C 341.

„Der heutige Künstler . . . ist auf eine bestimmte Gruppe sittlicher Ideale angewiesen, auf die Selbstvervollkommnungsideale Goethes. Deren letzter Inhalt ist, daß einer sein eigenes Wesen erkennt und es in Stolz und Vornehmheit durch fortgesetzte Reinigung zu seiner reinen Gestalt herausarbeitet.“³

„Da man kein freundliches Gefallen an der Reinigung des Bösen erwarten kann, so kann nur die des Guten und Reinen in Frage kommen.“⁴

The subject of a modern tragedy would therefore be: “der Kampf zwischen dem Willen zur Reinigung und der menschlichen Bedürftigkeit.”⁵ Tragedy, Ernst asserts, is a moral philosophy of life: “Das Tragische . . . ist Weltanschauung, Wille und Sittlichkeit.”⁶ Since it provides the greatest emotional experience, it is also the highest form of art, and it does not create pity and fear but highest pride and joy in view of the moral greatness of the defeated hero. If the hero is to assert his freedom of choice, he must be confronted with several alternative ways of action, each of which will lead to his tragic destruction. The higher the position of the hero, the greater is the number of necessities to which fate subjects him, consequently also the greater the struggle and the emotional elevation of the spectator.

To these aristocratic views Ernst adds the further postulates that the poet is divinely called as a prophet and teacher, that the various poetic genres (“forms”) arose from definitely graduated and eternally unvarying emotional needs of man, that they are *Urbilder*. “Die platonische Idee ist auch dasselbe, was meine Form ist.”⁷

According to Ernst the object of art is, in effect, to translate a transcendental idea into reality without unnecessary appeal to and confusion of the senses. This strong insistence on abstraction of the “essential” and ultimate — leading him to reject Shakespeare in favor of the more rigid structural technique of Sophocles and culminating at one point of his career in the demand: “das Gefühlsmäßige zu gedanklicher Fassung aufsteigen zu lassen”⁸ — is, of course, one of the most serious obstacles to a ready appreciation of Ernst. To deny this is to do him a disservice.

Ernst's concept of tragedy is then predicated upon a metaphysical world which is governed by sovereign laws of its own, and in which ethics and esthetics are inextricably interwoven.

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After years of search for the “form” of tragedy, Ernst produces, in the series of tragedies from *Demetrios* to *Brunhild* and *Ninon de Lenclos*, a number of basically ego-centric heroes. Almost at once, however, Ernst

³ WzF 46.

⁴ WzF 47 f.

⁵ WzF 47.

⁶ WzF 147.

⁷ EG 276.

⁸ Gww 8.

is confronted by a dilemma. If the tragic hero is absolutely to realize his transcendental self or his mission, he must, of necessity, come into conflict with the absolute moral code. In following the dictates of the latter, there can be no self-realization, at least not in the characteristically extreme — though convincing, as I wish to emphasize — conflicts which Ernst poses. As always, upon once having realized the existence of a problem, Ernst bends every effort to its solution. As he had previously postulated a graduated scale of literary "forms", he now postulates a graduated scale of human *Urbilder*, and characteristically concerning himself only with the highest of these: the *große Ausnahmemenschen*, he finds himself forced to reject the ethics of Kant's *Praktische Vernunft*:

„In seiner Brust trägt jeder sein Gesetz,
Das dem Gesetze keines andern gleicht.“⁹

This step, by which he now elevated to the position of an absolute a form of ethical relativism — which, in spite of its different origin and character from that of materialistic determinism, was still ethical relativism — was perhaps the most difficult step for him to take in his whole career in that it ran counter completely to his basically ethical, conservative nature. Nor was he able to proceed at once to its dramatic treatment. Demetrios welcomes death as a liberation from the constraint of violating his moral personality and Jaufré in *Das Gold* dies because he cannot bring himself to any action in his even stricter adherence to the absolute moral code. The problem nevertheless is present, for both are *unsure* of themselves and their missions.

In *Canossa*, however, Ernst not only proceeds directly to the problem of the exceptional character but goes beyond it in creating a necessity so compelling as to make the realization of self or mission impossible even in violation of the moral code. Heinrich, who knows only amoral devotion to himself, must choose between self-assertion and the empire, while Gregor, who in absolute devotion to his mission and against his moral nature has already sacrificed the salvation of his soul, must choose between the destruction of his life's work and his duty as a priest to absolve the repentant sinner. The tragic greatness which Heinrich and Gregor achieve in this submitting to a necessity, which does not even offer the possibility of heroic death as an alternative, constitutes almost the utmost which Ernst has to offer as a tragic poet. With the exception of Heinrich's cursing his fate and Gregor's cursing his God, Ernst has already here created his later "metatragic" hero whose submission is complete.

Ernst achieves the desired form of the absolute tragedy in *Brunhild*, where each character is a complete expression of the law of his innermost being and where there is no connection between the ethical plane of the *obere Menschen*, Brunhild and Siegfried, and that of baseness occupied by Chriemhild and Gunther. The only point of intersection is the tragic

⁹ Dr II, 23.

situation of Hagen, the servant, who longs for the upper plane but remains bound to baseness by his oath of loyalty. Here then, Ernst has at last realized his goal in the tragic hero for whom, as in the case of Siegfried and Brunhild, evil and guilt do not exist and who can remain true to himself only in willingly accepting death.

But there is yet a further step possible in the direction of complete self-realization, the absolute assertion of evil. Ernst takes this final step in *Ninon de Lenclos*. The comedies which Ernst had written in the meantime, and through all of which runs a serious undertone, treat on a lower, ironic level the problems of his tragedies. In *Der heilige Crispin*, the most important of these, which is in one sense a transition already to the following period, the hero becomes comical in evading his mission by hiding cowardly behind his confused conscience.

* * * * *

The proud personal isolation of Ernst had led him to create his proudly isolated tragic heroes. But upon the discovery that his tragic isolation is in fact the only reality of his ego-centric world — that his world is *godless* — his profoundly religious nature suffers the deepest despair.

„Das Höchste, was Menschenwille für sich allein erringen kann, ist das Tragische, denn das Höchste des Menschenwillens ist das Ethos; aber es gibt Höheres als den menschlichen Willen, nämlich den göttlichen, und Höheres als das Ethos, nämlich die Religion.“¹⁰

As the will of the tragic hero had heretofore been the only reality, so now the divine will becomes the only reality and necessity is reasserted in its most exacting form. Again the position of Ernst is extreme. In the *Erlösungsdrama*, with the surrender of the personal will, with the complete submission to the will of God and to being in good *and* evil an instrument merely in his plan, Ernst's now "metatragic" hero achieves the state of *Seligkeit*, a concept which Ernst consciously borrows from Fichte.¹¹

With the redemption of the patricide Ariadne by the understanding God Dionysos, who — and this is important — longs for the world of man because he has realized:

„Leiden nur ist Leben . . .
Der Götter ewig heiter Sein ist Tod“¹²

and who has become "free" only because he has suffered in the world of man, Ernst in principle, though not in fact, attains the freedom of his soul. We have here a first statement of the mystic position of the polaric interdependence of God and man. But in advancing again from this newly gained position — and proving, I believe, that this position is a postulate merely and not a reality in Ernst's experience — he arrives at the demonic,

¹⁰ C 29.

¹¹ ZI 87.

¹² Dr II, 361.

destructive and "unfree" Apollo who denies redemption to Cassandra. And here Ernst's effort to find God is given overwhelming tragic expression.

Although the *Gnadendrama* affirms suffering as the only way of being drawn up to God, Ernst's intensely self-willed and aristocratic personality, spurred by his fundamental ethical activism, seeks to escape from the religious fatalism implied in the ever-increasing irrationality of God by re-asserting the mystic position with strong emphasis on man:

„Wir müssen festhalten: Gott ist. Aber niemals werden wir wissen, wie und wer Gott ist; denn all unser Wissen ist notwendig eingespannt in die Formen unserer Vernunft . . .

Wir müssen auf der anderen Seite festhalten: Gott wird von jedem Menschen im Lauf seines Lebens — eines sittlichen und vernünftigen Lebens — geschaffen; geschaffen nicht als ein außerhalb dieses Menschen stehendes Wesen . . .

Also einerseits: Gott ist; andererseits: Gott ist ein Vorgang an uns . . .

Dies Einerseits und Andererseits muß nun zusammenkommen.¹³ But, this cannot be accomplished in the drama of Ernst with its conscious effort to abstract and crystallize the essential. For the mystic polaric interdependence between God and man of Ernst's experience — as can be seen from numerous statements¹⁴ — is of dynamic, ever-variable character, now God compelling man and now man creating and expressing his God in his personality and work. Consequently Ernst's dramatic development stops in effect with the one-sided, God-dominated and therefore ultimately unsatisfying relationship found in *Kassandra*.

The plays which I have not yet mentioned: *Manfred und Beatrice* and *Preußengeist* preceding *Kassandra*, and *Yorck* and *Chriembild* following upon *Kassandra*, offer either lesser variations of the metatragic hero or spring once more from the conflict with Kantian duty. They are therefore based upon a much earlier level of experience and have comparatively slight bearing upon his experience of God. *Kassandra* represents in every sense the climax of Ernst's dramatic development, and although the tragedy of the prophetess is, of course, that of the ethically-centered hero despairing of the mysterious and irrational God, I feel that perhaps there may be in the lines addressed by Apollo to Cassandra a *subconscious* expression of the shattering of Ernst's crystalline dramatic form by the overpowering experience of God:

„In einem bunten Blumengarten bist
Du still erwachsen, den der Gärtner pflegte:
Die Mauer schützte gegen scharfe Winde,
Der Gärtner goß und band an Stäbe an,
Die Beete waren ordentlich geteilt,

¹³ C 261-62.

¹⁴ Kurt Kükelhahn, *Das Weltbild Paul Ernsts*, Diss. Leipzig, 1938, pp. 96 ff. has called attention to the sometimes astonishing correspondence between some of these statements of Ernst and those of Angelus Silesius' *Cherubinischer Wandersmann*.

Dem Fuß anständig jeder Weg geharkt,
 Und alles zierlich, reinlich so geordnet,
 Daß ein gewaltig Wirken eines Gottes
 Nicht möglich war. Gottlos habt ihr gelebt.
 Gott aber rast im Sturme übers Meer,
 Wirft heulend auf die schwachen Wälder sich,
 Die krachend, splitternd unter ihm zerstieben.“¹⁵

But whether this passage has any direct bearing upon the problem or not, I do believe definitely that the experience of the mystic polaric interdependence of God and man, dynamic and ever-changing, shatters Ernst's dramatic form. In order to express it in its uncanny mystery — above all to express it in a manner which gives adequate scope as well to the pole of man in the dualism, of the great creative personality demanded by Ernst's own intensely aristocratic nature — Ernst must set a whole world in motion. He needs nothing less than the tragic 300 year struggle between the emperors and popes, which he interprets as springing from their total devotion to their ideals of establishing, each in his own way, the kingdom of God. In the absolute devotion to this ideal, which compels them to do evil as well as good, and in the overwhelming suffering and despair which springs from this, the emperors and popes feel themselves alternately as the mere tools of God and as sovereign, proud, creative, self-realizing personalities. Thus Barbarossa:

„Ich wirke, und ich bin gewirkt. Ich wandre,
 Ich denke, frei. Doch mir befiehlt der Andre.“¹⁶

And Henry IV:

„ . . . Vielleicht spielt Gott ein Spiel.
 Er spielt es mit sich selbst, den König zieht,
 Den Ritter, Bauern. Wenn Einer fiel,
 Das war, weil das im Spiel nun so geschieht.
 Das rätselhaft Unheimliche ist nur:
 Von selbst zu gehen glaubte die Figur;
 Sie fühlt sich nicht von Gottes Hand gezogen;
 Sie meint, daß ihren Gang sie hat erwogen.“¹⁷

Or Gregory VII:

„Ich, bin ich ich? Ich bin ein Muß und Werde,
 Ich bin das Schaffen Gottes auf der Erde.“¹⁸

And Innocent III:

„Auf seinen Platz ist jeder Mensch gestellt.
 Will Einer, was er kann, mag ich nicht schelten.
 ‚Will, was du mußt!‘ für unsereins soll gelten.
 Gott braucht den bösen, wie den guten Mann,
 Gott braucht die böse, wie die gute Tat,

¹⁵ Dr III, 162.

¹⁶ K III, 229.

¹⁷ K II, 559.

¹⁸ K II, 516.

Weil Gott ja sich nicht selber helfen kann
 Und für das Handeln doch die Menschen hat . . .
 Die Freiheit aber ist für Menschen nicht.
 Wenn Gott zu seinem Stellvertreter spricht,
 Ist der der höchste Mensch: Mir ist von allen
 Menschen am meisten Unfreiheit zugefallen.“¹⁹

But in the conviction that their missions are revealed to them by God, they assert with greatest pride that freedom which consists in their total responsibility — may God redeem or damn them in the end — for the means employed. Thus Henry II:

„Ich bin der König, und die Schuld ist mein.
 Ich muß sie auf mich nehmen, ich allein.“²⁰

Or in the words of Henry IV:

„Es gibt nur meine Pflicht,
 Mich kümmern Seligkeit und Himmel nicht.“²¹

* * * * *

Ernst's subconscious need of a "form" which might express more adequately his religious experience must then be regarded as the principal reason for his transition from the drama to the epic. I find reasonable additional proof for this interpretation in Ernst's paradoxical endeavor to reconcile this step with his previously formulated literary theories, in which the epic as a "form" is rated as inferior to both the drama and the Novelle. Thus, after restating this theoretical position in the *Vorwort zum Kaiserbuch*:

„Nun scheint es wohl ein dreistes Unterfangen, wenn ein Mann, der genau weiß, daß er ein Dramatiker ist, ein Epos dichten will. Denn dramatische und epische Begabung schließen sich aus. Das Wesentliche der Begabung ist das Temperament, und man hat entweder ein episches Temperament oder ein dramatisches.“²²

he attempts nevertheless to prove the existence of a close relationship between the modern epic poet and the dramatist.

Of course, with immediate reference to the *Kaiserbuch*, the long and tragic struggle between the emperors and popes has, in the ordinary sense of the word, exceedingly dramatic qualities and is, to be sure, because of its immensity impossible of dramatic treatment. But this is not his meaning. Rather, these theoretical discussions of the *Vorwort* are based definitely upon the basic postulates of his mystico-religious experience with reference to his own particular type of drama and admit by implication, it would seem to me, the fundamental impossibility of giving satisfactory dramatic expression to that experience:

„Die alten Epiker, auch die uns noch am modernsten anmutenden, wie Firdusi und die Mahabharata-Dichter, kennen fast

¹⁹ K III, 613 f.

²⁰ K I, 551.

²¹ K II, 532.

²² C 51.

immer nur den Menschen und haben noch nicht die eigentümliche Verbindung von Willen und Schicksal durchschaut, welche zuerst dem Dramatiker aufgegangen ist. [Some years later he states that the real difficulties of the drama lie "in der geheimnisvollen Verbindung von Schicksal und Wesen des Helden, die ein Erlebnis des Dichters sein muß, ein *religiöses Erlebnis*." ²³ (italics mine)] *Wir aber heute sind nach dem Drama.*" ²⁴ (italics mine).

„Stellen wir uns Gott vor, wie er gegen sich selber Schach spielt: so erscheint uns heute die Welt.

Wir können uns heute das Leben eines Menschen nur denken als bestimmt durch seine Aufgabe, die ihm durch seine äußeren Verhältnisse gesetzt ist und durch die Art, wie er seine Aufgabe erfüllt oder nicht erfüllt. Damit ist das alte Epos unmöglich geworden, muß unser Epos, wenn wir ein Epos versuchen wollen, aus der Gefühlswelt des Dramatikers heraus gedichtet sein.“ ²⁵

I consider these theories — aside from the astonishing insight which they offer, in their full context, into the essential character of earlier epics — as having been primarily written *pro domo*, as an effort, characteristic for Ernst, to "rationalize" his transition from the drama to the epic.

Of course, other and more obvious reasons must be considered, among them the fact that his dramatic work had been given practically no consideration by his nation and his avowed desire, in view of the disastrous end of the war, to achieve a "nationale Tat" by recreating poetically a period of German greatness. But I believe that these considerations were in fact secondary and gave a new impetus merely to his attempt to express more definitely his religious experience, connected perhaps with the opportunity offered by the subject of depicting for once an "integrated" social "form" or society representing a full scale of graduated human *Urbilder* — a concept so dear to him.

That his mystical religious experience with its overpowering feeling of infinity was primarily involved in the transition from the drama to the epic seems furthermore to be clear on the basis of the following citations. In the *Vorwort zum Kaiserbuch* of 1921, from which I quoted above, he states, "daß es mir heute so erscheint, als ob meine Dramen den Umkreis der dramatischen Möglichkeiten umfassen." ²⁶ In *Mein dichterisches Erlebnis*, written nearly at the end of his life in 1932, he says significantly with reference to the *Kaiserbuch*:

„Ich glaube, daß ich in ihm zu der äußersten Möglichkeit dessen gelangt bin, was mit den dichterischen Mitteln darzustellen ist . . . Hier lösen sich die Tragödien der einzelnen großen Männer, der Päpste wie der Kaiser, in einem Bild des allgemeinen Weltgeschehens, das freilich begrenzt ist, wie jedes Kunstwerk

²³ WzF 20 f.

²⁴ C 53.

²⁵ C 54.

²⁶ C 45.

begrenzt sein muß, aber doch eine Ahnung des Unbegrenzten geben kann."

Whereupon he continues:

„Ich bin von der Verzweiflung erlöst.“²⁷

The fact that now his own redemption is gradually becoming a reality, that he is gaining indeed the freedom of his soul, is perhaps best indicated by the presence within the framework of the *Kaiserbuch* of the twenty odd charming *Märchen*, in which for the first time he is able to give free rein to his fancy without any motive involved aside from the pure pleasure afforded by poetic creation.

But tragedy, the tragedy of his own aristocratic isolation, continued to be Ernst's fundamental experience. Toward the end of his life he drew ever closer to Christianity as a tragic aristocratic view of life. Thus in his last great work, *Der Heiland*, the epic treatment of the mysterious tragic figure of Christ afforded him the ultimate possibility, at least, of bridging the gap between necessity and free will and of creating also the ultimate symbol of the God-man polarity of his religious experience. The Christ of this epic is therefore an aristocratic figure who does not proclaim a paradise on earth but: "Das Himmelreich ist . . . in Euch"²⁸ and "Folgt mir nach"²⁹ and "Wer sein Leben fortwirft, der allein gewinnt sein Leben."³⁰

* * * * *

It has been my endeavor to show the dualistic character of Ernst's experience of the world and of God — "mein eigenes Leben, wunderbar geführt und stolz gewollt"³¹ — in its essential treatment within those works which he himself designated as the most important and in its effect and impact upon his concept of "form".


²⁷ C 27.

²⁸ H 40.

²⁹ H 48.

³⁰ H 100.

³¹ C 267.



DER DEUTSCHE KAUZ IN DER ROMANTIK UND IM BIEDERMEIER ¹

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Daß der deutsche Kauz sich nicht auf dem Boden der Klassik, sondern auf dem der Romantik entwickeln konnte, liegt klar auf der Hand. Für seine volle Entfaltung bedurfte er der gefühlsmäßig bedingten Bestrebungen der Romantik. In deren Betonung des Ichs, der Persönlichkeit des Einzelnen, in dem Streben aus dem Alltagsleben hinaus in eine verklärte Welt, in dem Bejahen der Begierden und Leidenschaften, ja sogar in der Ironie des überlegenen romantischen Schöpfers selbst, fand der Kauz Nahrung zu seiner Entwicklung. So gewann er Gestalt und, in den künstlerischen Händen Jean Pauls, eine Art von Daseinsrecht in der deutschen Literatur.

Zu welcher Form der Kauz sich in der Romantik entwickelt hat, und wie sich diese von der des biedermeierlichen Sonderlings unterscheidet, soll in dieser Arbeit gezeigt werden. Dazu soll auch hervorgehoben werden, inwiefern die einzelne Gestalt die Bewegung kennzeichnet, welcher sie entnommen ist.

Um diese Aufgabe zu lösen, sollten wir vielleicht über eine Definition einig werden. Stellen wir also folgende auf: Ein Kauz ist ein Sonderling, dessen Eigenheiten aus seiner Persönlichkeit, aus seiner Natur herauswachsen und nicht von äußeren Verhältnissen unmittelbar bedingt werden. Er denkt und handelt nach seiner persönlichen Gemütsart, ist also eine vollständige menschliche Persönlichkeit, unterscheidet sich aber von dem gewöhnlichen Menschen durch seine Wunderlichkeiten, die entweder psychologischer oder ethischer Natur sind.

Wenn wir nun mehrere typisch romantische Käuze näher betrachten, wird es klar, was für einen starken Einfluß die Betonung des Ichgefühls auf die Gestaltung des Kauzes ausgeübt hat. Ja, man würde kaum fehlgehen, wenn man behauptete, ohne diesen Nachdruck wäre der deutsche Kauz überhaupt nicht entstanden. Indem die Romantiker aber solch großes Gewicht auf die Gemütsbefindung des Einzelnen legten und dadurch der Persönlichkeit eine Daseinsberechtigung gaben, war kein großer Schritt nötig, um das Individuelle und Sonderliche hervorzuheben und darzustellen.

In dem romantischen Kauz ist diese Eigenschaft natürlich übertrieben und ins Lächerliche gesteigert. Das sieht man in den Sonderlingen Jean Pauls, der in dieser Hinsicht echter Romantiker ist. Denke man z. B. an den kleinen eingebildeten Wuz, der seinen Abendspaziergang mit seiner Geliebten in die Klopstocksche *Messias* hineinwebt, oder an den Gotthelf Fibel, der seinen Namen in die Titelblätter anonymer Bücher hineindruckt, um sich mit anderen großen und berühmten Gelehrten vergleichen zu können. Der Schmelzle befriedigt sein Ichgefühl durch seine Behauptung, er sei ja nicht furchtsam sondern nur vorsichtig. Übrigens sei er stets ein

¹ Vortrag gehalten am 28. Dezember 1940 vor Deutsch IV der MLA.

großer Held in seinen Träumen, was doch schließlich beweise, er könne kein Feigling sein. E. T. A. Hoffmanns Baron von B. will den großen Geigenmeister spielen und läßt es sich manches schöne Stück Geld kosten, bekannte Geiger als seine Schüler nennen zu können. Der alte Verwalter in Tiecks *Gesellschaft auf dem Lande* bekräftigt seinen Wahn, einmal preußischer Husar gewesen zu sein, durch den preußischen Zopf und durch seine Uniform. Der alte Vetter mit der roten Nase in Arnims *Majoratsherren* versucht seinem vernachlässigten Selbstbewußtsein genüge zu tun, indem er noch immer seine volle Uniform trägt, sich eine Prise Schneeberger Schnupftabak alltäglich vor dem Hause seiner Geliebten nimmt, und diese alte Hofdame heiraten will.

Im Biedermeier dagegen, wo das Ichgefühl völlig im Sinn für das Ganze untergegangen ist, wo der einzelne seine persönliche Wichtigkeit dem Allgemeinen untergeordnet hat, wo das Individuum nur als ein Teil des Ganzen bedeutend ist, sind die Käuze, die mit den obenbesprochenen vergleichbar wären, entschieden anders. Erstens sind die biedermeierlichen Sonderlinge überhaupt viel sanfter, edler, gemäßigter. Sie haben Eigenheiten aber keine Schrullen, sie sind nie lächerlich — wie die der Romantik — noch belächeln sie sich selbst, sie heben sich nicht durch ihre psychologischen, sondern durch ihre sittlichen Sonderheiten von den andern Menschen ab. Also ist erstens derjenige als Kauz zu kennzeichnen, der sich am Sittengesetz vergriffen hat.

Denke man z. B. an Stifters Abdias, der sich mit Gewalt aus seinen Standesschränken emporarbeiten will, wobei er beweist, er könne sich nicht dem Weltplan unterordnen; oder an die Grafen Scharnast in der *Narrenburg*, die ihre biedermeierlichen Sonderbarkeiten in ihrer Heftigkeit gegen das Sittengesetz veranschaulichen; oder an den Hagestolz, der sich nicht dem Wohl des Ganzen unterordnet und seine Pflicht als Mensch nicht erfüllt. Man denke auch an den Larkens aus Mörikes *Maler Nolten*, der selber in die Liebesverhältnisse zweier Leute eingreift, sich also eines Frevels gegen die Weltordnung schuldig macht und dadurch einen unnatürlichen Seelenzustand aufweist. Ferner sei noch Friedrich Mergel aus Droste-Hülshoffs *Judenbuche* angegeben, dessen Vergreifen am Sittengesetz ihn zum Sonderling macht, der aber seine Schuld durch einen freiwilligen Tod sühnt und dadurch die Weltordnung wieder ihre Rechte behaupten läßt.

Wenn wir uns jetzt wieder zur Betrachtung des romantischen Kauzes zurückbegeben, zeigt sich, daß ein zweiter Charakterzug der Lust, das Philistertum zu verspotten, entspringt. Diesen Zug erkennen wir in dem lächerlichen Bemühen des Jean-Paulschen Wuz, sich eine Bibliothek zu erschreiben, und in den erfolglosen Versuchen Gotthelf Fibels, Zerstreutheit eines Gelehrten nachzuahmen. Hierher gehört auch der titelstolze Kanzleisekretär aus Hoffmanns *Brautwahl*, der sich gewissenhaft auf seine Heirat vorbereitet, indem er *Die politische Klugheit* von Thomasius fleißig studiert. Ferner sei noch der Maler Wehmüller aus Brentanos Novelle erwähnt, der immer mehrere Dutzend Nationalgesichter im Voraus malt,

ehe er die Leute gesehen hat, und dann die Leute selber ihre Proträts aus-suchen läßt.

Das Verlangen, sich über das Philisterhafte lustig zu machen, bedingt also diese Eigenschaft des romantischen Kauzes. Aber wie verschieden ist der entsprechende Charakterzug des biedermeierlichen Sonderlings! Anstatt des Spottes über das kleinbürgerliche Leben, finden wir hier den Genuß des beschränkten Bürgerdaseins, der schlichten Alltagsfreuden als ideale Lebensart dargestellt, denn das Lebensideal des Biedermeier ist (nach P. Kluckhohn) „anspruchloses Sein-Glück-finden in der Beschränkung, in den Freuden und in den Sorgen des Hauses“.² Was also die Romantiker als philiströs betrachteten, steigert sich hier zur Lebensformel.

Diese Lebensanschauung drückt sich natürlich in den Käuzen des Biedermeier aus. Man denke an den ausgedienten Steuereinnahmer Knisel aus dem Bruchstück einer Erzählung Mörikes, betitelt: *Die Geschichte von der silbernen Kugel*. Dieser typische Biedermeierkauz, der vielleicht ein Taugenichts der Biedermeierliteratur hätte werden können, betreibt jede Tätigkeit, welche die Romantiker als spießbürgerlich bezeichnet, und über die sie sich lustig gemacht hätten. Herr Knisel benimmt sich stets mit Offenheit und Hingabe, in dem vollen Glauben, was er tue, sei un-gemein wichtig. Und dennoch empfindet der Leser nie eine Neigung zum Lachen, auch wenn jener sein Privatkapitalbuch so reinlich hält, „als gälte es ein Muster dieser Art für ewige Zeiten“, oder wenn er seine gesammelten Steine, Pflanzen und Käfer mit der größten Genauigkeit systematisch katalogisiert und in einer Kammer, die im oberen Stock liegt und meistens unbewohnbar ist, zur Schau ausstellt.

Man denke ferner an Grillparzers *armen Spielmann*, der doch wirklich ein kleinbürgerliches Dasein führt, und zwar mit der vollsten Überzeugung, seine Hingabe an die Kunst und sein schlichtes bescheidenes Leben seien durchaus nicht umsonst gewesen. In diesem Zusammenhang könnte man auch etliche Gestalten Tiecks erwähnen, dessen spätere Novellen viele biedermeierliche Züge enthalten.³ Hingedeutet sei nur auf den königlichen Rat Freimund im *Zauberschloß*, der ja auch ein zerstreuter Gelehrter ist, der aber durchaus nicht lächerlich erscheint. Im Gegenteil fühlt sich der Leser mit echter Sympathie diesem zerstreuten Rat zugetan, der nicht einmal weiß, daß er zerstreut ist. Man vergesse auch nicht die Gestalten Stifters (wie z. B. den Landpfarrer im *Kalkstein*), die mit der größten Liebe in ihrem kleinbürgerlichen Leben beschrieben worden sind, die aber doch als Sonderlinge gekennzeichnet werden müssen.

Wenden wir uns wieder den Käuzen der Romantik zu, so sehen wir, daß sich eine dritte Gruppe aus dem romantischen Hang, den Leidenschaften freien Lauf zu geben, entfaltet hat. Allerdings geben die Romantiker zu, daß zügellose Hingabe an die Sinnestriebe ihre Gefahr mit

² Paul Kluckhohn, „Biedermeier als literarische Epochenbezeichnung (*Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift*, Bd. 13 [1935], S. 16).

³ Cf. Professor Edwin Zeydels Abhandlung: „Ludwig Tieck und das Biedermeier“ (*Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, Bd. 26 [1938], S. 352 ff.).

sich bringt, doch deuten sie auf keinen Ausweg, sondern begnügen sich mit einer bloßen Darstellung der Leidenschaftsausdrücke.

Man denke z. B. an den Todeswahn des Quintus Fixlein, an den leidenschaftlichen Hang zum gesteigerten Stolz des Professors in Tiecks *Übereilung*, oder an den grillenhaften Beamtendünkel des Kanzleisekretärs aus Hoffmanns *Brautwahl*.

Da das Biedermeier aber solch starke Betonung auf Maß legt, begnügt sich der Biedermeierdichter nicht mit der bloßen Veranschaulichung der Leidenschaften, sondern führt seine Gestalten zur Überwindung derselben. Das tut z. B. Stifter in der *Mappe*, im *alten Siegel*, in der *Brigitta*, ja sogar im *Hagestolz*. Mörike geleitet auch seine Lucie Gelmeroth durch ihre Leidenschaft zur vollen Erkenntnis der Gefahr, in welcher sie schwebte, und damit zu einem glücklichen Ausgang. Tiecks Alter vom Berge verzichtet auf Liebe, denn das Heiligste in der Liebe werde doch durch tierisches Verlangen nach Sinnesgenuß zerstört. Und der junge Held in Tiecks letzter Novelle überwindet seine Leidenschaft zur Waldeinsamkeit.

Die letzte Kategorie unserer romantischen Käuze ist von der Idee der Weltflucht bedingt. Und da diese Empfindung aus dem Gefühl des Zwiespalts zwischen Idee und Welt erwachsen ist, steigert sie sich oft zur Verzweiflung. Weil der romantische Mensch sich weltfremd fühlt, flieht er entweder in die Phantasie- und Märchenwelt hinein, oder, wenn er verzweifelt, in den Tod.


Zu der ersten Klasse gehören etliche Hoffmansche Sonderlinge: der ungeschickte Student Anselmus aus dem *goldenen Topf*; der Ritter Gluck, dem die Welt nicht genügende Anerkennung erweist und der sich in seine Phantasiewelt zurückzieht; und der Astrolog Dapsul von Zabelthau, der sich oben in einem Turm aufhält, die Welt unter sich vergißt und der Sternenwelt lebt. Hierher gehören auch Arnims Fürst Ganzgott und der Sänger Halbgott, welche miteinander die Lebensrollen tauschen und sich dadurch im Leben zurechtfinden, sowie der alte Römer aus Tiecks *Gesellschaft auf dem Lande*, der aber verzweifelt und also zu Grunde geht.

Der Biedermeiermensch dagegen findet sich in den einschränkenden Verhältnissen des Lebens zurecht, indem er auf irgendeinen Ruhm der großen Welt verzichtet, seine Leidenschaften zu überwinden sucht, und eine Harmonie auf der Ebene des Maßes zwischen Ideal und Wirklichkeit erreichen will. An Stelle der romantischen Weltflucht, weist das Biedermeier also Entsagung auf.

Diese Lebensanschauung bedingt natürlich die biedermeierlichen Käuze. Tiecks Alter vom Berge verzichtet ganz auf ein gesellschaftliches Leben, und paßt sein Dasein der Wirklichkeit an. Mörikes Herr Knisel entsagt einem öffentlichen Erfolg und beschränkt sein Schaffen auf ein stilles, häusliches Leben. Grillparzers armer Spielmann sagt sich von der großen Welt los und begnügt sich mit einer stillen, kleinbürgerlichen Existenz. Der alte Rentherr in Stifters *Turmalin* (um nur *eine* Stiftergestalt herauszuheben) entsagt einem ehemals glänzenden Familienleben und verbringt seine letzten Tage unter den ärmsten und schlechtesten Umständen.

Der biedermeierliche Kautz hebt sich also stark von dem der Romantik ab und stellt, wie dieser, die Charakteristika seiner literarischen Epoche dar. Während er in der Romantik starke psychologische Eigenheiten aufweist, zeigt der Sonderling im Biedermeier, wo Maß und ein zurückgezogenes, Gott-ergebenes Bürgerleben überwiegend sind, Eigentümlichkeiten, die von einer Betonung des Ethischen zeugen. Durch eine eingehende und vergleichende Studie des Kautzes also treten die Merkmale und Verschiedenheiten der in Betracht kommenden Bewegungen klar an den Tag, weil die charakteristischen Eigenheiten so zu sagen konzentriert in den einzelnen Gestalten erscheinen.

Eine Erweiterung und Fortführung dieser Untersuchung — was der Verfasser zu tun hofft — sollte auch die anderen und neueren Bewegungen erleuchten. Solch eine Arbeit könnte z. B. klar machen, daß Keller und Raabe u. a. zum Poetischen Realismus gehören und nicht zum Biedermeier.



NOCHMALS „IMSTANDE SEIN“

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In seinem Artikel in „Monatshefte“ XXXI (1939), S. 394-9: „Im Spiegel der Sprache: I. *imstande sein*“, versucht H. Sperber sein langjähriges Programm der Erhellung geläufig gewordener sprachlicher Bildungen durch Zurückgehen auf das Ursprungsmilieu, in dem die Bildung einen konkreten Sinn hatte, um ein neues Beispiel zu bereichern. Nach ihm ist die vom 16. Jh. ab belegbare Familie von Wendungen wie *imstande sein*, *zustande bringen*, *zustande kommen*, *instand setzen* usw., zusammen mit *Gegenstand*, *Widerstand*, *beständig*, *einen Stand tun*, *einen harten Stand haben* usw., aus dem Kriegswesen der frühen Neuzeit, wo das Fußvolk (nicht mehr die Reiterschar des Mittelalters) durch seinen *Stand*, durch das Ausharren in der *Stellung*, den Ausgang der Schlacht bestimmte, zu erklären: *imstande sein* heißt ‚in einer militärischen Stellung sein‘, im 18. Jh. überschreitet, diese Phrase die Grenzen ihres urspr. Geltungsgebiets und *imstande sein zu* wird = ‚die Möglichkeit haben‘ usw. Natürlich legt sich Sperber die Frage vor, ob *imstande sein zu* nicht Bedeutungslehnwort aus frz. *être en état de*, cf. engl. *to be in a state to*, sein könnte, und löst diese Antinomie, indem er für den Fall einer Bedeutungsentlehnung dieser nur den *ersten Antrieb* zum Zustandekommen der Wendung zuschreibt, während die innerdeutsche, kulturgeschichtlich bedingte Entwicklung die Rolle des *fixierenden Faktors* hätte. Eine banale Wendung, in ihrem Ursprungsmilieu betrachtet, bekommt so Farbe und Leben.

Als Romanisten macht mir dabei nur Bedenken, daß eine Lehnübersetzung *être en état de* + *imstande sein zu* einen ganz anderen Sinn als die frz. Originalwendung bekommen sollte (was z. B. bei *Staatsmann* = *homme d'état*, *dritter Stand* = *tiers état* nicht der Fall ist), eben den militärischen von *Stand* ‚Stellung‘, der der frz. und ebenso der ital. Phrase (*esser in istato da* ‚in einem Zustand sein, der es ermöglicht, zu...‘ wird von Gherardini in einer anonymen Novelle des 14. Jhs gebucht) vollkommen fehlt: die romanischen (notabene: gelehrten) Vertreter von *status* bedeuten niemals ‚militärische Stellung‘, sondern immer ‚Zustand‘ („malgré l'étymologie, il ne me semble pas que l'idée d'arrêt, de repos, soit impliquée à un degré quelconque dans ce mot français *état*“, schreibt Lachelier in Lalande's „Vocabulaire de la philosophie“) und auch das Lateinische kannte nur *status* in der Bdtg. ‚Stellung eines Einzelkämpfers‘ („... in re militari dicitur positio, quam quis sumit, aut in qua se collocat pugnaturus“, Forc.-De Vit, so bei Plautus: *in statu stat senex, ut adoriatur moechum* ‘h. e. se composuit ad adoriendum, instar gladiatoris[!] pugnaturi‘). ‚Widerstand leisten durch Stehen‘ wird im Afrz. durch *prendre*, *faire*, *se metre a estal*, das auf das von der Wurzel **sta-* abgeleitete germ. *stall* (REW³, 8219) zurückweist, der ‚Standplatz‘ durch das substantivierte Partizip *estant* (zu *stare*, *ibid.* 8231) ausgedrückt. *estre en estat de* ist im Frz., soweit ich sehe, erst bei Montaigne belegt: *ils sont morts en estat de n'avoir pas leur soul a manger*, wo die Bdtg. noch nicht ist ‚imstande

zu', sondern 'in dem Zustande, wo sie nicht genug zu essen hatten', vgl. noch Rabelais *estoit decreté qu'il entrast a Rome en estat triumphant, il y entroit sur un char* 'im Stande des Triumphators'. Auch noch im 17. Jh. ist *être* und *mettre en état* de noch keineswegs formalisiert (ebenso wenig wie das ital. *esser in istato da* des 14. Jhs.), wie man aus einer Stelle wie Corneille, *Sophonisbe*: „J'y mourrai sans regret, si mon dernier moment / Vous laisse en *quelque état* de régner sûrement“ (Livet, *Lex. de Molière*) ersieht. Auch die Bdtg. ist noch nicht durchwegs 'imstande sein', sondern *état* heißt darin 'situation morale, humeur', wie Cayrou, 'disposition dans laquelle se trouve une personne', wie das Akademie-Wörterbuch von 1694 erläutert, vgl. die Beispiele bei Cayrou und Littré:

Mon père *est en état* de vous accorder tout, / Il vous craint (Corn., *Polyeucte*); Mon cœur(!) a beau vous voir prendre sa querelle, Il *n'est point en état* de payer ce grand zèle (Mol., *Misanthrope*); J'aurois . . . assez de *pouvoir sur moi-même* . . . pour *me mettre en état* de ne rien faire voir qui fût indigne de votre sang (*id.*, *Am. magn.*); Le monde est si inquiet, qu'on ne pense presque jamais à la vie présente et à l'instant où l'on vit, mais à celui où l'on vivra; de sorte qu'on est toujours *en état* de vivre à l'avenir, et jamais de vivre maintenant (Pascal); Son âme était *en état* de paraître devant Dieu (Bossuet).

Die Adelung'sche Definition von *imstande sein*, 'die nötigen Kräfte, das Vermögen, den Willen dazu haben' paßt auch fürs Frz. dieser Zeit. Dieses *état* geht nun wohl auf lat. Ausdrücke wie *in statu innocentiae, gratiae* etc.

Δ frz. *en état d'innocence, de grâce*, dtsh. *im Stand der Unschuld, der Gnade*¹ (vgl. *Gemütsstand*, *Dtsch. Wb.* s. v. *stand* 6b) zurück, d. h. auf ein ganz anderes Milieu als das militärische, nämlich das religiöse.

Nun gesellen sich aber zu unserer Wortfamilie noch die englischen Wendungen *to be (stand) in state*, 'to be firmly established, or flourishing, to be intact, in statu quo', *to bring in, to (one's) state*, 'to reinstate to restore', *to put (out) of state* usw., die seit dem Ende des 13. und Anfang des 14. Jhs. belegt sind (dazu 1651: *put him in estate to* = frz. *en état de*, Oxf. Dict.) und jedesfalls nicht auf die von Sperber fürs Nhd. herangezogene Änderung der Kriegstechnik zurückgehen können. Andererseits haben die engl. *to make a stand, to be at a stand, to come to a stand, to bring (put) to a stand*, die gerade vom Ende des 16. und Anfang des 17. Jhs. ab belegt sind und auch in die militärische Atmosphäre passen (wie auch *to be in a position to*), gerade *nicht* die Bdtg. 'imstande sein zu' (**to be in a stand to* . . .) entwickelt.

Die vorstehenden Zeilen sollen nicht dazu führen, Sperbers Gedanken abzulehnen, sondern darauf hinzuweisen, daß das deutsche *imstande sein* vielleicht doch nicht ohne seine europäischen Vorgänger endgiltig erklärt werden kann — ähnlich wie *beständig* wohl nicht ohne das Vorbild von lt. *constans*² —, andererseits daß, wenn wir eine Lehnübersetzung annehmen,

¹ Vgl. noch die Stelle der Lutherbibel in der Epistel Pauls an Titus 3, 8 „auf daß die, so an Gott gläubig sind geworden, *in einem Stande guter Werke* gefunden werden“, wo die Vulgata hat: „et de his volo te confirmare, ut curent *bonis operibus praeesse*, qui credunt Deo.“

² Es wäre noch anzumerken daß — ebenso wie seine romanischen Vorbilder — das spätere, etwas bürokratische (*nicht*) *in der Lage sein* einen vorwiegend prosaischen

diese den Sinn der Worte der Modellsprache getreulich widerspiegeln sollte. Ich kann mir diese Art von ‚Kuckucksbildung‘, bei der einer älteren Wendung in der entlehnenden Sprache ein neuer Sinn unterlegt würde, auch in der von Sperber so vorsichtig eingeführten Abwandlung einer „fixierenden Kraft“, vorläufig noch nicht recht vorstellen. Aber vielleicht gelingt es Sperber, wie in anderen Fällen, diesen Umdeutungsprozeß noch weiter zu erhellen.

Charakter hat – bot es sich als Remedur für die Vieldeutigkeit und relative Schwäche von *können* dar? Einen Racine-Vers wie „*Il peut, seigneur, il peut, dans ce désordre extrême, Épouser ce qu'il hait . . .*“ im Deutschen gleich eindrucksstark wiederzugeben ist kaum möglich.

BERICHTE UND MITTEILUNGEN

Modern German Bibliography for 1940

Owing to difficulties caused by the present European conflict, it has been thought advisable to postpone the publication of the modern German bibliography for 1940 until next autumn. It will appear in the November number of this journal, together with a supplement for 1939.

Colleagues who are interested in making this bibliography as complete as possible are requested to send to the chairman of the committee the titles of Ph. D. dissertations in the modern field (from 1880 to the present), which were presented in 1939 or 1940.

*University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Canada*

– *H. Steinhauer*
Chairman of the Committee

The Middlebury College School of German at Bristol, Vermont, has through the generosity of the Henry Janssen Foundation been enabled to add to its staff as a guest professor for this summer Dr. Franz Rapp, formerly Chief Curator of the Theatre Museum and lecturer at the Deutsche Schauspiel- und Filmschule in Munich, at present Honorary Research Fellow in Theatre and Dramatic Criticism at Yale University. Dr. Rapp will give a course of lectures on the development of the German Stage from the middle ages to our present time, complementing a corresponding course on the history of the German drama. The catalogue for this year lists 14 courses, among which are the usual practice courses, methods of teaching, phonetics, history of the language, history of German art, a survey of classical literature, the novelle of the 19th century, and the fiction of Thomas Mann.

Three SCHOLARSHIPS are available, awarded on the basis of need, merit, and scholastic promise to graduate students who would be unable to attend without financial assistance.

The *Martin Sommerfeld Scholarship* of \$60.00,

(awarded yearly and established in the summer of 1939 by students and colleagues of the late professor Martin Sommerfeld).

Two scholarships of \$50.00 each, which the School is able to offer this year owing to a special grant of the Henry Janssen Foundation.

Application should be made before May 1, 1941, to the Dean of the German School, Professor Werner Neuse, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont.

BÜCHERBESPRECHUNGEN

Complete College German.

Comprising a German Grammar for Beginners and a Grammar Review, by *Erich Hofacker and Richard Jente. Heath, 1939, xxix, 400 pp. Price \$1.75*

The Title. According to the limitations frankly admitted in the Preface (iii), "Complete" is fully defined in the subtitle, and "College" simply implies maturity of "reading material and exercises" and not an "especially advanced" presentation of grammar; thus the authors themselves nullify their pretentious title.

Relation of Parts I and II. Instead of developing a progressive two-year course, with the essentials for beginners in Part I and, in Part II, gradual advancement from the syntactic level attained at the end of the first Part, the authors have chosen to review by topics, in the 16 lessons of Part II, the ground covered in Part I, in approximately the same sequence, from the articles to the subjunctive. Consequently there are only six subjunctive clauses in the 14 lessons preceding the review of the subjunctive, despite the fact that five of the 14 are devoted to verb review.

The lack of progress in Part II, apart from the more difficult style of the reading matter, is nowhere more evident than in the treatment of the modal auxiliaries: nothing is added to the presentation in Part I, for although par. 164 (Lesson VIII) calls for a review of the second subjunctive forms of the modals and irregular weak verbs, no use is made of them in the reading matter or exercises.

Although numerous principles of syntax are formulated for the first time in Part II — for instance, the many idiomatic uses of the definite article — most of them have been employed, some repeatedly, throughout Part I. One of the serious faults of the book, in fact, is the

general practice of using principles in advance of their explanation. This is especially blameworthy if the oversights involve idiomatic difficulties; but it is indefensible in a "College" grammar to defer to Part II such elementary concepts as simple and compound tense forms (Lessons VI and VII) and "the genitive corresponds to the English possessive case or to the objective case preceded by *of*" (Lesson XIII).

There is a marked tendency to state grammatical principles vaguely in Part I and to restate them clearly in Part II. Yet the reverse is often the case, and the partial restatement of what is already complete in Part I simply wastes space.

However enthusiastic the philologists may grow over the morphology and semantics in Lessons III and IV — the only new major feature in Part II — the mass of details will bewilder the freshman and sophomore no less. To be effective, such studies must be presented systematically in the lesson vocabularies and not piled up in such large quantities and then dropped without further use, as here, and as was done with the chapter on "Relationship" in the Introduction.

Reading Material. The "regular reading texts" of the first ten lessons are a travelogue, which is well done, on the whole; yet some of the students soon lost interest in it because they found so little empirical matter in the narrative.

The indiscretion in making Thomas Mann the victim of the coarse joke in Lesson XI is inexcusable; and it is unfortunate that in Lesson XII the soldier's moral obliquity, which Hebel explicitly condemns, is apparently sanctioned. Beginning with Lesson XV most of the regular reading matter deals with great personages and forces in the development of German civilization and culture, written with enthusiasm and, for the most

part, with understanding. The statement about Austria (210), however, absolutely misrepresents the underlying causes; and the ardor and naïveté displayed in several other chapters in Part II may easily arouse disadvantageous resentment at present. Is there any significance in the selection of the poem on pp. 104-05 in preference to the better known one with the same title? Part I contains ten lyrics, Part II scarcely any. The reverse would seem more rational, especially since some of the poems are difficult and subtle, and too beautiful to be desecrated for their meager grammar illustration.

Pronunciation. The parenthesis in footnote (xv) is superfluous. The last paragraph on p. xvii belongs under II, next page, as does ACCENT (xxiv). Is *tief* (xviii) an example of double vowel, and is *pf* (xxiii) one sound? The statement under A (xviii) applies to *long* vowels only. The pronunciation of *-ti-* in words like *Nation* is not given until p. 216. Oversights are: *Berlin* (6), *Hannover* (88), *außerordentlich* (130), *Charaktere* (98), *Dresden* (161), *sobald* (171), *Person* (225), *zurück* (238), *unterrichten* (253), and *willkommen* (289).

Why discuss cognates (xxvi ff) but ignore them (xviii ff) by rendering *See* as *lake*, *Land* as *country*, *eben* as *just now*, and above all *Axt* as *hatchet*, to cite only a few; and why so positive about absolute meanings (xxix), notably *Acker*, *Ofen*, *Strom* (cf. 375: *Strom*, *stream!*).

Punctuation. Several very essential points are omitted (xxv), and failure to apply them has caused some 88 errors in punctuation on 61 pages, among them: commas omitted before 32 complete clauses, 25 superfluous commas before *als* or *wie* and 12 before *und* or *oder* when not followed by complete clauses.

Lesson Vocabularies (Symbol below: LV). The separation into two groups, *active* and *passive* words, wastes the students' time and serves no purpose except to indicate as *active* the words starred in the AATG list as a minimum for the first college year. At all events, the *passive* words are used as freely as the *active* in all exercises. Even more strange is the splitting of Supplementary Reading vocabularies, since they are not integrated with the lessons. Incidentally, 32 words grouped as *active* are not starred in either the AATG list or the German-English Vocabulary (351-382; Symbol below: G-E-V), and 26 words grouped as *passive* are starred in both.

Unfortunately, lack of space forbids listing these words or citing many examples in the following paragraphs; therefore, when feasible, the aggregate of various phenomena will be given, to indicate their relative importance.

a. Omissions. At least 77 words have been omitted from the LV, and only 17 of these are in the G-E-V. Of the total 77, 48 are compounds (37 being separable verbs), e.g.: *bekannt machen* (169), *Wagner Oper* (11, *passim*) and similar ones (22, 119, 231), *vier und ein halb* (88), *irgend ein* (259, etc.), *wie viel* (138), *Zeit lang* (291), etc. On the other hand, *sodaß* (119) and *umso* (228) are incorrectly compounded.

b. Other errors. Some words need additional meanings, e.g.: *take* for *machen* (16) and *bringen* (22), *Zettel* (83), *Knecht* (162). Wrong meanings noted are: the un-American *good day* (6); cf. also *billig* (72), *führe heim* (105), *Siebenbürger* (244), *Reihe* (284), *solid* (291). Meanings not applying to the lesson should not be given in the LV; among the 23 noted are: *frei* (6), *Bild* (86), *Rat* (139; no pl.), *reizen* (284). In addition, some 20 miscellaneous inaccuracies, e.g.: *steigen* for *besteigen* (120), *god* (171); also the syntax of verbs, *ist* with intransitives, and several plurals omitted. Delete (*to a person*) after *überlassen* (177; cf. 176:11), and change to *sich wenden an*, turn or appeal to (80).

Idioms and Syntax. The apparent difference of the authors toward idiomatic usage is phenomenal: although about 60 idioms are included in the vocabularies, at least 80 others are omitted. These range from single words like *kommen*, *get*, *stehen*, *be*, and simple phrases like *in der Schule*, *auf dem Land*, *Wort halten*, to the more difficult, such as: *solche*, *die* (169), *wollte von . . . nichts wissen* (85), *schnitt ein saueres Gesicht* (133), *nichts von sich hören ließ* (169), and even *nie ist ein Meister vom Himmel gefallen* (73). One wonders where the beginner is to glean so much wisdom.

Some 18 errors in idiom and syntax have been noted, e.g.: *reiste die Familie . . . hatten sie*, etc. (60); *ins Tal sehen, oder den Feldberggipfel* (68); *zum alten Rathaus oder einem . . . Gebäude* (114); *nicht einem* (121); *Er will ein Dichter sein* (67); *er* (antecedent *man*) (102); *Kepler ist . . . geboren* (152, etc.); *geboren war* (280); *an* (156d, 5); *verstand, und der seinen Sohn* (283); *am meisten* (285c, 10); *der . . . Kräfte . . . in sich*

regen spürte (292); and regarding the subjunctive forms *sollten* (67) and *sollte* (68:12) "ought to" as indicative.

Grammar Principles. A peculiar characteristic tone of uncertainty is needlessly produced by the excessive use of generalizing expressions, often in lieu of specific details, often gratuitously, e.g.: *the so-called, if necessary, nearly all, in general*, and the favorite *commonly* which occurs on almost every page.

a. Incorrect statements. On the other hand, principles which are not absolute and even statements which are untrue are occasionally set down as law with categorical finality, e.g.: "*auch* (precedes word modified)" (6); "Many German verbs are found only as reflexives" (76); the pl. of most nouns of Class I (96) and the comparison of most monosyllabic adjectives (134) have umlaut (See Curme); *entweder . . . oder* and *weder . . . noch* do not affect word order (117; cf. however 120:3); and *sondern* introduces a contradiction (117); further, that the agent is never expressed with the apparent passive (175); that numbers are written in groups (also delete "usually") (228); that *-ik* is always stressed (106); that *gelingen* and *geschehen* are always impersonal verbs (288); also classifying the indefinite numeral *jeder* as a demonstrative (26, 127); and calling the infinitive clause a phrase (242). Further, there are eleven errors in par. 108; change "ends in" to "adds" (par. 65,5) and "pronoun" to "pronominal adjective" (par. 176,5). In par. 165, *emp-* is omitted and the prefixes *hinter-*, *voll-*, *wider-*, being variable, belong in par. 167; *miß-* has peculiarities that ought to be explained; *be-* should be included as still active in coining. Exceptions to par. 176,8c are the ordinals and *letzt* when used as substantives (See Duden). On p. 287 only *gedenken* and possibly *sich enthalten* "require" the genitive, and among the adjectives *bewußt*, *gewiß*, *kundig*, *ledig*, *sicher*, and *würdig*.

b. Peculiar statements: "definite" and "indefinite" as applied to pronouns (75); calling the absolute superlative adverb the "attributive form" (136); "*haben* has lost the *b*" in *hatte* (26). The concept "verbal adjunct" is as erroneous as its demonstration (par. 15, 27, 171) is unscientific. The following should be recast: par. 4 (also add *es*; cf. Index); par. 88, now meaningless, as is "if possible" (par. 90,1) and "without implying comparison" (par. 93, 94), also the last two lines on p. 255. Define "proper auxiliary"

(par. 28) and "proper names" more accurately (par. 152); also change the ending *-ns* to *-ens* and at least explain the origin of the fractional ending. Are *trimken* and *schießen* intransitive verbs (par. 190)?

c. Incomplete statements. The following paragraphs should specify the points here suggested: inverted order (22,1); difference when subject is owner (24,125, 185); difference between noun and pronoun subject (49,3); also reflexive pronoun (77,4 and 5); in inverted order (77, 5); explain *das* in the conclusion (83,2a); older genitive formations and modern apostrophe (140); partitive noun (154); brusque commands in general (159d); *auf* with the quarter hours (106); names of meals (125).

d. Omissions. Among the principles completely overlooked are: inverted and transposed word orders in exclamations; unlike *was*, *wer* may not have an antecedent; *mal*, as in *zwei mal eins*, and other mathematical terms; use of the past tense similar to the present (par. 157,3); verbs compounded with verbs (par. 166).

e. Discrepancies. In par. 43 and 44 certain pronominals are grouped as *dieser*-words and *kein*-words, without previous use or explanation of the terms; note the vacillating terminology used in discussing these groups (par. 43, 44, 124, 128, 130, and p. 317); and in the classification of nouns (Part I, Part II, and Appendix); the inconsistent genitive and dative singular forms of monosyllabic nouns (pp. 26, 51, 89, 97, 99, 319, 326); changed classification of *geschehen* (pp. 58, 240); likewise the difference between theory and practice in the adjective endings after *manche* (cf. pp. 109, 222 with text 137: 17). The idiomatic perfect for the English past tense does not justify the substitution in paradigms (e.g. pp. 57 f) or isolated examples.

Exercises. Well planned, as a rule, for variety and effective drill of the principles and forms involved. That verb drill has a prominent place in 24 of the 29 lessons of Part I shows sound judgment, which is compromised, however, by the hocus-pocus and unnecessary difficulty of the "progressive" conjugations and "sliding" synopses. *September* should be *November* (157 f, 1); some of the sentences on p. 178 are too difficult, and those in *d* are ambiguous; insert *zu* before *ihm* (193a, 1), and in 2 and 8 change the impossible introductory clauses. Why the peculiar contradiction (268) between

Ques. 3 and sentences 1 and 2 of a below?

Written Translation. Explain the difference between *da* and *dort* (12); how is *impression* (74:10) to be translated? (*Eindruck*, p. 54, won't do!) The English words cited on the following pages do not identify the needed German translation in previous LV, several are not even in G-E-V: 12, very much; 18, available; 24, go; 31, a great deal; 71, brisk; 112, rule, princes; 141, whereas; 173, was forced; 94:9, own (cf. 139).

Misprints. Chapter heading omits "Interrogative" (25); misspelling *Goetz* (54, *passim*); VIII needs period (132); several verbs in wrong order and five omitted (144); bold face type needed for *will* (189) and very inconsistently used (192 f). Compare *-ion* (106) with *-tion* (216); add pl. of *die See* (217). Words are in wrong order in LV (6, 24, 28, 92, 225, 293).

The Subjunctive. The rather awkward and unclear presentation of the Prokoschian "Types" and the strict adherence to the "Conditional" of the older terminology seem to earmark the work of recent converts. Especially confusing are the following statements: the last paragraph, p. 187; — in par. 119a: *but are quoted; if possible; and retains the tense* (which seem to be contradicted in c below); — and the two jumbled par. 119c and 123.

The double infinitive requirement (cf. notes, pp. 183 and 184) is not binding on the authors themselves (cf. pp. 158, 182, 248, 311). The categorical "must" (note d, p. 184) may be expedient here, but should be modified in Part II, and the use of *dann* included (cf. 102:5). Unfortunately, Type I is not used after *als ob*, nor Type II in the Indirect Discourse (192 f).

Lesson XV, Part II, calls for review of Type I only, but both types are needed; par. 196 refers only to par. 119 but reviews also par. 120-122. The space devoted to par. 196 and 197 is wasted. On the other hand, par. 198 and 199 are both an amplification and an improvement of par. 115-117; the note on p. 311, however, contradicts note a, p. 184; but fortunately all the distressing first person *would's* of Part I have changed into faultless *should's* in Part II. (Dual authorship?)

Appendix. The material included is adequate in scope, but much of it does not correlate with the other sections of

the book in content or form or both. A thorough checking is advisable, especially of the nouns, prepositions, and adjectives. Likewise, the general vocabularies and the Index contain so many errors of every description that a complete revision should be made when the book is revised.

Make-up. Binding, paper, and typography are excellent. Two suggestions for improvement seem in order: (1) Break up the reading texts into more paragraphs, and (2) indicate at the top of each page the grammar paragraphs comprised in each lesson, also indicate in the Index both the page and paragraph numbers.

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Deutsche Kultur. Ein Lesebuch.

H. Steinhauer. Oxford University Press, 1939.

Professor Steinhauer of the University of Saskatchewan has in a recent article in the *Monatshefte* shown how he teaches his elementary students. I was struck by his statements because they agreed almost verbatim with an address that I had delivered before the Texas State Teachers' Association in 1937 and which was subsequently published in *The Peabody Reflector and Alumni News*. The keynote in either instance was about this: If we give our students substance, interesting and valuable matter, if we do not treat the language as a tool subject, if we do not try to make the course easy and superficially attractive, (but actually repulsive to all those students for whom we should care), if, in short, we have self-respect, we need not worry about the position of language studies. I have, in a more philosophical manner, discussed these and related problems in my review of President Hutchins' book on *The Higher Learning in America*, *Philosophia* III (1938), and received an extraordinary number of favorable comments from colleagues and university administrators. There also is an indication in the various publications of the last year that language teaching is entering a new stage. It is obvious that, after the losses during and after the world-war, an unusually careful method of an almost apologetic nature had to be adopted as regards the re-introduction of German, and it is unfortunate that, through more recent political friction, this attitude of self-defense has returned more strongly and developed into a spirit like this: "Why? German is easy

and pleasant. You should take it! You must not think that we want to defend National Socialism. We are speaking of the old Germany. But really it is easy, and then, with radio and movies, newspapers and modern commerce, it is also useful. You might want to travel there some day!" Nothing can be worse than this attitude; for nothing will more definitely confirm a belief such as the "competitors", who live on so-called Social Science or Education, are eager to uphold, viz., that the languages really have no specific value in a democratic system. Yet, trying to lure students by the usual methods of *Emil and the Detectives* implies the admission of that erroneous belief.

The only acceptable alternative is to be self-assured and to tell of the things that are valuable. It is foolish to spend a year or two on preparing a student for the reading of German literature and then to lose the student before he gets to what we want to give him. I have, for years, brought Stefan George to the beginners, and they can read and understand Hesse or Rilke or Goethe or Droste or Keller as well as we could understand the Beowulf or the Heliand or the Edda, even though we were just "beginners" when we started Anglo Saxon, Old Saxon, or Old Norse. If we do our teaching as we should we can dispense with the analytical method that goes on the wrong premise that the student has to be taught German like a baby when, in reality, we could draw on his knowledge of the language which he already has acquired.

It is psychologically unintelligible why the playful methods that once were used in the kindergarten or in the elementary schools should be applied to students who, in their other subjects, are supposed to study the most difficult things that the human mind of the last three thousand years has designed, matters like calculus, logistics, physics, astronomy, and it is slight wonder if the student considers his German as a mere trifle, and if college presidents as well as the colleagues in the scientific subjects are induced to look down on the language instructor. In the light of German university history, we can understand this very well: First, the universities appointed dance-masters, fencing masters, and language teachers without giving them professorial rank. When the languages were taught scientifically and when literature became the subject of

teachers who left the tool idea behind, languages and literatures began to rank with the other disciplines. We can, and we should, learn from this instance at least one thing: Let us not spend more than a few weeks on the elements of grammar; let us not waste time with preparation; let us go into the actual reading of valuable works, and, in reading, acquire the language. It might be bad for the elementary text-book business, but it would be good for the student and our courses and — ourselves.

Mr. Steinhauer is herewith supplying those who would care to bring substance to their classes with an anthology of prose and verse selections, with sufficient notes and a good vocabulary. The selections have the headings: *Mythos und Legende, Geschichte, Biographisches, Selbstbiographisches, Dichtung, Gedankliches, Humor*, and cover the usual spread of German history from legendary Siegfried to Charlemagne through the centuries up to the present day. The political note is entirely absent, and Heine is well represented; and when Binding is given, Remarque is added. One might always argue as to this or that selection; the fact remains that we have here a book that, in the hands of any class, from the beginners on, but under the guidance of a good teacher, allows for teaching along the lines developed above. A few days ago, one of the most eminent mathematicians in the country wrote me that he was engaged in writing a Calculus book—"which is no great novel but at least a serious effort at scholarship in a text book. It is a virgin field." There is no reason why we should ruin our literature classes by wasting two years on teaching the language by the most cumbersome and childish manner of approach, instead of leading the student to the substance of literature, throwing the burden of acquiring the tools on him and — his high school. If the student gets interested in something essentially worthwhile he will not mind the time spent on it, and he will wish, and ask, that the preparation be given before he enters college. It does not matter at all if he makes mistakes and plenty of them; they too will disappear in course of time. And if we read trash and eight-hundred-word-texts made up from lists and counts, errors are not weeded out either, as all of us have experienced. Instead of trying to reach a low goal, not ever attained to perfection, let us set the goal

higher, even if perfection will equally be impossible! At least, we will have striven for something worth-while.

—Heinrich Meyer

The Rice Institute.

Modern Language Teaching,

by Charles H. Handschin, Professor of German, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, World Book Company, 458 pages; \$3.00.

Das Buch gliedert sich in 14 Abschnitte, die jeweils in verschiedenen sachlich gegliederten Unterabteilungen behandelt werden: History, Objectives, General Method, Assignments, Reviews, Tests, Oral Work, Grammar, Word and Idiom Study, Reading, Visual Materials and Realia, Individual Differences, Student Activities, Administration Problems, and Teacher Training.

Wer Handschins 17 Jahre früher erschienenen Pionierbuch der Methodenlehre kennt („Methods of Teaching Modern Languages“ — New York 1923), wird dankbar sein, daß der Verfasser jetzt die meisten der schon darin erörterten Gebiete neu durchgearbeitet und in unmittelbare Beziehung zur Gegenwart gebracht hat.

Ich denke z. B. an die Beschreibung der Geschichte des modernen Sprachunterrichts, wo der Verfasser die Bedeutung politischer Einflüsse, die fördernd oder hemmend gewirkt haben, klar herausarbeitet, und er viele andere Fachleute darüber sprechen läßt, welche Kräfte in der Gegenwart entscheidend an einer Neuformung des Sprachunterrichts schaffen.

Über sein erstes Buch hinaus geht auch das Kapitel über „Objectives“, indem Handschin sich ganz undogmatisch über den Streit bezüglich der einzelnen Lehrmethoden stellt und keine einzige absolut empfiehlt oder verwirft, sondern ein organisches Hervorwachsenlassen der Arbeitsweise aus dem jeweils verschiedenen Unterrichtsziel vorschlägt.

Bei dieser Einstellung des Verfassers kann jeder Lehrer bei ihm Anregung finden, ganz gleich, zu welcher Methode er sich persönlich bekennt, und welche Altersstufe er unterrichtet.

Mit dem feinen Verständnis des erfahrenen Erziehers zeigt Handschin individuelle Richtlinien mit Rücksicht auf die besonderen Interessenssphären von Kindern, Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen, und gibt überzeugende Ratschläge, wie schwachbefähigten Schülern zu helfen sei. Er baut keine Luftschlösser; seine belebenden Vorschläge stehen mit beiden

Füßen in der Wirklichkeit des täglichen Unterrichts und gründen sich hauptsächlich auf seine schon im Vorwort betonte Überzeugung, daß im modernen Sprachunterricht mehr gelesen werden müsse als bisher.

Jedem Kapitel sind dankenswerterweise Fragen und, im Anhang, eine Leseliste angeschlossen, die den Lehrer zur Weiterarbeit auf dem besprochenen Gebiet anregen sollen.

Für den Fachspezialisten wäre es vielleicht wünschenswert, wenn der Verfasser die Unterrichtsprobleme der vier Fremdsprachen Deutsch, Französisch, Spanisch, Italienisch nicht synoptisch, sondern getrennt behandelt hätte, weil hier wissenschaftlich unterschiedliche Gebiete vorliegen. Dagegen wird der Highschool-Lehrer, der meist mehrere Sprachen unterrichten muß, gerade die Vergleichende Darstellung begrüßen. Einen ganz entschiedenen Nachteil dieses zusammenstellenden Verfahrens zeigt jedoch die Bibliographie im Anhang, wo der Verfasser aus der Fülle des vorhandenen Materials über vier lebende Sprachen nur eine Auswahl treffen kann. So bleiben viele wichtige Hilfswerke unerwähnt.

Für den jungen Highschool-Lehrer stellt das Buch eine Fundgrube von Anregungen dar, mit Angabe der maßgebenden Fachzeitschriften, der Adressen zur Erlangung von Filmen, Grammophonplatten, Austausch-Stipendien usw., einem allgemeinen Fragebogen zur Kontrolle von Hauslektüre jeder Art, und dem Lehrplan-Umriss für einen sechsjährigen Junior Highschool-Kursus in Deutsch, Französisch, Spanisch und Italienisch. Auf jede mögliche praktische Frage versucht Handschin die sachkundige Antwort zu geben.

Handschins Buch ist ein bedeutsamer Beitrag zur Methodik des neusprachlichen Unterrichts.

—Agnes Kuehne, Ph.D.

Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn.

Intermediate German Workbook,

by M. Blakemore Evans and Frederic J. Kramer, Ohio State University. F. S. Crofts & Co., New York. \$.75.

Die Betonung des Lesens in unserm Unterricht hat zur Folge, daß im zweiten Jahre wenig Zeit für die Wiederholung und Erweiterung der grammatischen Kenntnisse vorhanden ist. Es ist darum natürlich, daß sich nicht selten unangenehme Lücken bemerkbar machen. Das vorliegende Büchlein will helfen, diesem

Übel zu steuern. Es soll vor allem eine systematische Wiederholung der Grammatik und planmäßige Erweiterung des Wortschatzes und der Ausdrucksfähigkeit sicherstellen. Der Lehrstoff ist in 24 Lektionen eingeteilt, die 49 Seiten einnehmen. Jede Lektion enthält zunächst einen Abschnitt aus Heinrich Seidels „Leberecht Hühnchen“, an den sich Anmerkungen und Fragen schließen. Es folgt dann ein Abschnitt über Wortbildung, der in vielen Fällen der häuslichen Beschäftigung überlassen werden könnte, wie auch der Leseabschnitt wenig Schwierigkeiten bieten sollte, so daß auch darauf wenig Zeit in der Klasse verwandt werden brauchte. Es folgt dann die Grammatik. Hier wird immer auf bestimmte Abschnitte eines 11 Seiten langen Anhangs hingewiesen. Die Zahl der Hinweise ist manchmal ziemlich groß, und der Benutzer des Büchleins muß recht viel nachschlagen, was nach meiner Beobachtung nicht gern getan wird. Die Anlage des Buches rechtfertigt aber diese Einrichtung und läßt der Selbsttätigkeit des Studenten viel Spielraum. Den Beschluß jeder Lektion bilden englische Sätze für die Übersetzung. An ihnen ist hervorzuheben, daß sie in einem guten Zusammenhang und in naher Beziehung zum Lesestoff stehen, so daß der Student eigentlich kleine Aufsätzchen übersetzt, die ihm Muster für freie Darstellungen sein können. Die üblichen Wörterverzeichnisse folgen. Nach dem Vorwort soll es möglich sein, das Büchlein im Laufe eines Jahres durchzuarbeiten, wenn man in jeder Unterrichtsstunde 10 bis 15 Minuten auf je einen Abschnitt verwendet. Das ist gewiß ein praktischer Plan. Es ist keine Frage, daß dieses Arbeitsbuch sich als praktisches Hilfsmittel bewähren sollte.

—E. P. Appelt

University of Rochester.

Lebensbilder aus der deutschen Geschichte von Walther Gehl.

Edited by Paul H. Curts, Ph.D., Wesleyan University. Harper & Brothers, New York. \$1.40.

Das vorliegende Buch will wahrscheinlich dem sich gegenwärtig bemerkbar machenden Interesse für eine kulturkundliche Einstellung des deutschen Unterrichts Rechnung tragen. Es ist ursprünglich für den Geschichtsunterricht der Unterstufe höherer Schulen geschrieben worden und hat in Deutschland weite Verbreitung gefunden. Auf 93 Seiten bringt

es eine Darstellung der deutschen Geschichte von der „germanischen Heldenzeit“ bis zur Gegenwart. Selbst der Vierteljahresplan und die Einverleibung Österreichs und des Sudetenlandes haben noch Berücksichtigung gefunden. Nach dem Vorwort des Herausgebers soll das Buch geeignet sein, dem amerikanischen Studenten ein lebendiges Bild der deutschen Geschichte zu geben und ihm gleichzeitig zu zeigen, wie in deutschen Schulen die vaterländische Geschichte dargestellt wird. Mir will es scheinen, daß diese Aufgaben von einem Geschichtsbuche der Unterstufe am wenigstens erfüllt werden können. Gehls Bücher für die Mittel- oder die Oberstufe wären dann noch eher geeignet gewesen, wenn man überhaupt ein deutsches Geschichtsbuch verwenden will. Die „Lebensbilder“ aber sind für deutsche Kinder geschrieben und dürften schwerlich junge Amerikaner fesseln. Wahrscheinlich gibt es kein deutsches Schulbuch für den Geschichtsunterricht, das man ohne Bearbeitung unsern Studenten in die Hand geben würde. Ob man genug Zeit hat, ein Buch von über 90 Seiten zu lesen, nur um den Studenten zu zeigen, wie die Deutschen im Unterricht der Unterklassen ihre Geschichte behandeln, ist eine Frage, deren Beantwortung jedem Deutschlehrer überlassen werden muß. Wer einen Lesetext der vorliegenden Art wünscht, wird mit dem Buche zufrieden sein können. Der Herausgeber hat viel Mühe und Fleiß aufgewandt. Dem eigentlichen Text hat er eine Übersicht über die deutsche Geschichte und 16 Seiten Fragen folgen lassen, die zu Ausstellungen keine Veranlassung bieten sollten. Auch das Wörterverzeichnis mit seiner Fülle an Tatsachen, Namen und Zahlen ist sehr gut. Der Verlag hat das Buch mustergültig ausgestattet. 28 Illustrationen und 9 Karten bereichern den Text, und eine Karte nach dem Stande vom April 1939 ist ebenfalls vorhanden. Einband, Papier und Druck sind vorzüglich.

—E. P. Appelt

University of Rochester.

Briefe an August Hermann Francke,

herausgegeben von Theodor Geissendoerfer. Illinois Studies in Language and Literature. Vol. XXV, No. 1-2. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1939. Geheftet \$2.50, gebund. \$3.00.

In einem stattlichen Bande von über 220 Seiten legt der Herausgeber 174 bisher unveröffentlichte Briefe an August Hermann Francke und ein Tagebuchfragment

vor, die sich seit 1913 im Besitz der Universität Illinois befinden. Durch Entgegenkommen der Staatsbibliothek in Berlin und der Bibliothek der Franckeschen Stiftungen in Halle war es möglich, weitere 49 Briefe beizufügen. Unter den hier abgedruckten Briefen sind 70, die von der Mutter August Hermann Franckes an ihren Sohn gerichtet wurden. Beschäftigen sich diese auch meistens mit Familienangelegenheiten, so gewähren sie doch gleichzeitig einen Einblick in die Zeitverhältnisse. Viele der übrigen Briefe machen uns mit den Zuständen in den Franckeschen Schulen bekannt. Wir lernen Mißstände und Mängel kennen, die man zu beseitigen suchte, und wir erfahren auch, daß die Schüler nicht immer den Erwartungen entsprachen, sondern auch unbotmäßig waren und sogar ihre Bücher verkauften, um sich Taschengeld zu verschaffen. Etliche Briefe machen uns ferner mit den Beziehungen bekannt, die zwischen den deutschen und den schwedischen Pietisten bestanden. Wir hören, wie es den letzteren in der russischen Gefangenschaft in Sibirien erging und wie Rußland sich bemühte, die Segnungen westeuropäischer Kultur zu erlangen. Interessant ist, welche Rolle die Pietisten bei diesen Bemühungen spielten. So bietet das Buch wertvolles Material in kulturgeschichtlicher Beziehung. Ganz besonders lebendig ist das Bild des Schulens der Zeit, das man aus den Briefen gewinnen kann. Wer sich mit dem Studium des Pietismus beschäftigt, wird ebenfalls das Buch nicht ohne Gewinn benutzen. Darüber hinaus bietet sich hier aber auch Gelegenheit, Beobachtungen an der Sprache der Zeit zu machen und die Briefform der Periode zu studieren. Der Herausgeber hat den Text mit vielen Anmerkungen versehen, die eine gründliche Kenntnis der einschlägigen Literatur dartun und in ihrer Ausführlichkeit allen Ansprüchen genügen sollten.

—E. P. Appelt

University of Rochester.

Berühmte Forscher und ihre Beiträge,
Ein wissenschaftliches Lesebuch. Edited by Anthony E. Sokol and Helena M. Nye. American Book Co.

There comes a point in the pursuit of any science, where the student has to acquaint himself with the lives of the men who have gone before. The editors of this volume have seized on that moment as the creative point at which to introduce the student to scientific terminology

in a foreign language. In so doing, they have sidestepped the dilemma of many scientific German texts of either merely repeating content the student has already learned and therefore appearing dry, or of anticipating laboratory instruction, thereby reaching beyond the strictly language field and making doubly difficult the effort to get the purely language factors. But biography also holds a universal appeal and the lives of men who have been great in any phase of preparation for the world in which we live are pertinent even for non-science classes. At the same time, it is inevitable that the discussion and explanation of the specific contributions of the various men will bring in a large amount of the scientific terminology. Whether the biographical writing furnishes sufficient practice in the structural difficulties more frequently met in scientific treatises seems to the reviewer open to question.

The book seems especially suited for use in rapid reading or as collateral assignment for work outside of class. Although the pages are considerably wider than is customary for octavo books, the page of text is the usual size and placed rather close to the inside edge; the resulting space carries a running series of notes and specialized meanings for words, in addition to the notes and vocabulary at the back of the book. The 470 pages of text are broken into 40 chapters, of which 33 deal with the life and work of one scientist each, six double up on the presentation of two or three men together, and one is devoted to the early Greek scientists collectively.

The material is brought together out of eight different source collections of biographical material, and with one exception is reproduced unchanged. The text is supplemented by forty pages of notes, mostly identifying persons and places. In addition there are 77 pages of vocabulary which because of the width of the book are run in two columns. This allows for more words than the number of pages might indicate. But the coverage is extended and the advanced character of the book is demonstrated by the fact that the editors have purposely omitted from it words in the A. A. T. G. list.

On first view, the selection of the biographies chosen arouses disappointment; they seem to be a one-sided selection. A long series of physicians is followed without indication of any transition, by a very few biologists, and they in turn are suc-

ceeded by a longer list of natural scientists, including both chemists and physicists. Within each group the arrangement is historical; and from that viewpoint the selection represents more truly the actual development than it does a cross section of science today. The foundations of science go back through medicine and the physical sciences; psychology was long a branch of philosophy, and the social sciences are of very recent development. It would have been helpful to have had representatives from these fields included, as well as a larger proportion in biological science, but space, if not a lack of suitable material very obviously prevented. All the men treated of are important, even though some are not popularly known in this country. And the emphasis given by the editors will be finally justified by the fact that they do pay especial attention to the fields of greater interest to the majority of students taking scientific German, whether they be prospective chemists or engineers, physicians, biologists or geologists.

—Dr. Howard E. Yarnall

The Pennsylvania State College.

Bilderlesebuch für Anfänger,

Gerhard Wiens, *University of Idaho*,
Henry Holt & Co., New York. 1940. 200
pages, price \$1.32.

This is truly a new approach to the teaching of reading and will probably be welcomed by many teachers, who have tried and tired of most old methods. As the author promises in a helpful preface to the teacher, this method trains the student in direct comprehension and in using his reasoning power — both through the methodical use of pictures, cognates, and German notes and a carefully chosen selection of varying, informative and lively readings.

The cheering preface to the student suggests the attitude required of the reader — he'll need to do much guessing but even more "honest thinking." Cognates are explained and helpful hints on the use of the notes, appendix and glossary are given.

The reading selections offer real variety: some familiar and several new stories, a few "Plaudereien" on things German and a detailed account of an American student's average day.

Clearly the book has but one objective — to teach the student to *read* German. Of the 200 pages, 170 are devoted to the reading selections, 20 to the vocabulary

and only 10 to a grammar summary. The author undoubtedly expects the teacher to use a complete grammar text after this reader, for this Bilderlesebuch could not replace a regular grammar. It is very probable, however, that after the use of this book (and it might easily be covered in six weeks) the students will be much more adaptable to a thorough study of the complexities of grammar than otherwise. Their keen interest has been aroused, they no longer let grammar rules frighten them, as they are familiar with the general picture and need only fill in details, and they have some practical vocabulary ready for immediate use.

The clever little illustrations lend a touch of animated enjoyment to the book, besides aiding students to "guess" the meaning of words. The notes are conveniently placed at the bottom of the page, and as they are in simple German, they supplement the vocabulary. One might question the value of some cognate words, one might pick a few flaws here and there, but this reviewer prefers to stress the general qualities of the book. For a beginning reading text, to be read preferably before grammar study or otherwise concurrently, this Bilderlesebuch is a splendid innovation that will probably be welcomed warmly by many teachers eager for a lively, but methodical approach to beginning German.

—Frieda A. Voigt

University of Wisconsin

Extension Division, Milwaukee.

Das Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung,

Ricarda Huch. *Atlantis-Verlag. Berlin und Zürich, 1937. 477 S.*

Wenn man Nietzsche oft einen Dichter-philosophen nennt, ist es vielleicht nicht unangebracht, Ricarda Huch als Dichter-historikerin zu bezeichnen. Mit diesem unkonventionellen Ausdruck wird nicht beabsichtigt, ihre Gelehrsamkeit zu verdächtigen; es soll vielmehr nur hervor-gehoben werden, daß das Dichterisch-Ästhetische eine bedeutende Rolle in ihren historischen Darstellungen spielt. Unter dem Dichterisch-Ästhetischen wird hier die glückliche Fähigkeit verstanden, die ungeheure Masse geschichtlicher Ereignisse mit feiner künstlerischer Hand zu gestalten und die überragenden Individuen des Reformationszeitalters lebendig vor uns hinzustellen, wobei natürlich die unerläßliche Voraussetzung ist, daß der so vorgehende Historiker das Material möglichst vollständig beherrscht und ihm wissenschaftlich keine Gewalt antut.

Der nichtzünftige Rezensent des Huch'schen Buches, der nur die Arbeiten Paul Joachimsens und Karl Brandis kennt und in dem klassischen Werke Friedrich von Bezolds bisher bloß flüchtig gelesen hat, ist letzten Endes nicht zuständig hinsichtlich der eigentlich historischen Tatsachen. Diesen Aspekt der Kritik überläßt er gern den Kollegen vom Fach. Wenn der in erster Linie literarisch Eingestellte dennoch das Recht hat, ein Urteil abzugeben, so liegt das an der bereits eingangs betonten Eigenart des Buches und seiner Verfasserin. Wer von der Lektüre anerkannt guter Werke aus der Feder historischer Fachgelehrter zu Ricarda Huch's prächtiger Schilderung der Reformation und Gegenreformation kommt, kann sich des immer stärker werdenden Gefühls nicht erwehren, daß hier eben ein anderer Geist weht. Ohne auf die historische Seite des Buches näher einzugehen, die dem Nichtfachmann zuverlässig erscheint, muß klar herausgestellt werden, daß der Unterschied zwischen diesem Werke und anderen Büchern über das sechzehnte und siebzehnte Jahrhundert hauptsächlich darin besteht, daß eine Künstlerin, die die Wissenschaft ehrt, das Unzulängliche nurwissenschaftlicher Geschichtsforschung eben als Künstlerin durchbricht. Eine ausgeprägte Persönlichkeit, der die großen Probleme der führenden Geister jener Epoche zum eigenen Erlebnis geworden sind, erfaßt die mächtigen Persönlichkeiten von innen heraus und läßt die gewaltigen Gestalten der Nikolaus von Cusa, Kaiser Karl, Melancthon und besonders Martin Luther wiedererstehen. Dieser Nachdruck auf dem Individuell-Persönlichen ist es, der den von der Literatur herkommenden Leser fesselt, den vom Standpunkt der Historiker wohl ketzerischen Leser, für den die Darstellung der Geschichte erst da interessant wird, wo sie sich über das Allgemeine hinaus um das Unwiederholbar-Einzigartige bemüht. Dieser Forderung des vorwiegend künstlerisch orientierten Lesers wird Ricarda Huch auf das schönste gerecht. Daß trotzdem die geistigen Hauptströmungen nicht zu kurz kommen, daß sie das vor allem wichtige Persönlich-Individuelle trefflich umrahmen und in größere Zusammenhänge einordnen, macht wohl das Unvergleichliche dieser dichterisch-wissenschaftlichen Behandlung jener vielbewegten Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens aus. Vom Zusammenbruch der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung bis zum Westfälischen Frieden mit seinen politischen und geistigen Ergebnissen spielt

sich die deutsche Geschichte vor den Augen des gespannten Lesers ab. Es würde zu weit gehen, Einzelnes aus diesem in dichterisch schöner Sprache geschriebenen Buche herauszuheben. Selbst in einer kurzen Besprechung wäre aber hinzuweisen auf die glänzende, Tiefstes berührende Darstellung Martin Luthers.

Druckfehler sind zu verzeichnen auf S. 104, 111, 182, 398, 411, 457. Sonst vermißt man Verweise auf die Quellen, in denen man oft gern weiterlesen möchte. Die Verfasserin spricht an einer Stelle z. B. von „den Briefen, die Luther an Senfl schrieb“ (S. 468), auf eine anziehende Art, die einen verlockt, diese „Briefe“ selber zu lesen. Der Rezensent hat aber nur einen Brief an Senfel (*sic*) in der großen Ausgabe von Enders-Kawerau und den bisher erschienenen Briefbänden der Weimarer Ausgabe finden können. Hätte Ricarda Huch sich der Mühe unterzogen, derartige Angaben genau nachzuprüfen, hätte ein Versehen wie das obige, das gewiß geringfügig ist, mit Leichtigkeit vermieden werden können. Auf die Gefahr hin, als Pedant verschrien zu werden, muß der Rezensent gestehen, daß das Fehlen von Quellenangaben ihm den kritischen, mitarbeitenden Genuß einer hervorragenden Leistung getrübt hat. Daß trotz dieser Ausstellung das großartige Buch, das übrigens mit zahlreichen Holzschnitten versehen und auch sonst geschmackvoll ausgestattet ist, auf das wärmste empfohlen werden muß, sollte nach dem oben Gesagten auf der Hand liegen.

—Heinz Bluhm

Yale University.

Einführung in das Schrifttum der Gegenwart,

„Sammlung Ehlermann,“ Band 152. Dresden: L. Ehlermann, 1937. Pp. 83.

Dr. Köhler's readable little volume may be recommended to those who wish to become acquainted with the literary criteria of National Socialism. It presents a clearly outlined survey of the precursors and present representatives of the Third Reich in the realm of literature. In his foreword the author states that he avoided purely aesthetic evaluations, including only those writers whose works reflect the vital problems affecting the German people. No space is given to writers who left Germany after 1933.

Somewhat superficial are the initial chapters which briefly review the trends in German literature from Naturalism to

Neue Sachlichkeit. Köhler bestows only faint praise on George, Rilke, Hauptmann, and Hofmannsthal. Of Rilke he says, "Es fehlt das Lebensfähige, Heroische; sein Gotterleben gibt ihm nicht die schöpferischen Kräfte zum Wirken im Leben und in der Gemeinschaft." No mention is made of several more or less important writers whose works are published in Germany today: George Britting, Hans Fallada, Otto Flake, Paul Gurk, and Edzard Schaper, among others. Probably the author does not consider them sufficiently *völkisch*. Excellent are his concise discussions of Griese, Dwiniger, Blunck, Grimm, Zillich, Emil Strauß, Lersch, and E. W. Möller.

The most stimulating sections are entitled "Das Bauerntum in der Dichtung," "Kampf um Volkstum und Volksraum," "Im Takte der Maschinen," and "Kriegsdichtung." Very informative is the last section, "Aufbau und Förderung des Schrifttums durch Staat und Partei," which explains the official agencies exerting an influence on creative writing in Germany. The author makes the surprising statement that there is no censorship of intellectual life in Germany today, at least not in the publishing world. "Niemand ist gezwungen nationalsozialistisch zu schreiben, und kein Verleger bekommt Vorschriften über die Bücher, die er zu verlegen hat."

—Gerd Aage Gillhoff

The Tragedies of Herod and Mariamne, by Maurice J. Valency. *Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature*, No. 145. New York, Columbia University Press, 1940. ix & 304 pp., \$3.00.

This volume presents an unusually comprehensive treatment of a theme that has run the course of legend, history, mystery play, history play, comedy, and tragedy, the several forms of which have engaged the attention of men from the first to the twentieth centuries. The account of the sources of this persistent dramatic theme is an especially interesting one, particularly as they were embodied in the *Anti-*

quities of the Jews and the *Jewish War* of Flavius Josephus, whose works were among the first to be printed in the Renaissance. Beginning with a Latin edition printed in Augsburg in 1470, Josephus' writings went before 1500 through six Latin editions, printed in Italy, a French translation in 1492, and an Italian version in 1493. The sixteenth century saw nine more, including German, Dutch, and Spanish versions. The first English translation appeared in London in 1602.

Thus made popular and already a common theme in the cycles of mystery plays, the Mariamne theme readily became a prominent motif for Renaissance dramatists. In succeeding periods it has been even more persistent. Among the dramatic versions extant are four tragedies written in the sixteenth century, twelve during the seventeenth, seven in the eighteenth, twelve during the nineteenth, and five for the present century, — the most recent (1938), a free translation of Hebbel's play by Winifred Ashton (Clemence Dane, pseudonym).

While the theme has engaged the attention of dramatists like Hans Sachs, Hardy, Massinger, Calderon, Tristan, Voltaire, Hebbel, and Phillips, it is noteworthy that Corneille, Racine, and Shakespeare were not attracted to it, although the story itself had its greatest popularity during their eras.

Professor Valency has given us a very engaging history, paying proper attention to the sources and interrelations, of thirty-five of the Herod and Mariamne plays, so that his work illustrates the evolution of dramatic tradition over a period co-extensive with the whole history of modern drama. A highly significant feature of the study is the illumination it throws over the nature of the entire process of dramatic adaptation and the practice of specific authors of very different times and places. A wide extension of the principles and practice exemplified in this study to other comparable dramatic motifs is much to be desired.

—Henry A. Pochmann
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